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This thesis examines the potential for conflict in the Spratly Islands and 
determines whether the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed 
between China and ASEAN on November 4, 2002 together with ASEAN’s multilateral 
confidence-building measures mechanisms are able to prevent or manage this dispute. 
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have laid claims on some 
or all of the islands.  Many scholars have argued that the economic and strategic values of 
the Spratlys Islands underlay competing claims in the Spratlys.  In response to this, 
ASEAN is using Track I and II diplomacies to pursue solutions and confidence-building 
measures to prevent the dispute from escalating into a conflict in the region. All 
claimants except Taiwan are signatories. Can this dispute be resolved without Taiwan’s 
participation? This study concludes that this is a multilateral dispute that needs to be 
solved multilaterally by all the claimants. However, unless all the signatories adhere to 
the principles of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, no 
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The South China Sea, known in Chinese as Nanhai, or the South Sea, is part of 
the western Pacific. It is bounded on the northeast by the Taiwan Strait, on the east by 
Taiwan and the Philippines, on the southeast and south by Borneo, on the southern limit 
of the Gulf of Thailand and the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, and on the west and 
north by the Asian mainland.1 In this body of water lie many groups of islands consisting 
atolls, shoals, cays and banks. The Pratas Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, the Paracel 
Islands, and the Spratlys Islands are the main groups.2 The dispute about sovereignty 
over the Spratlys and the adjacent sea-space has been a sensitive and contending issue 
between China and five other claimants, resulting in several military clashes and near 
clashes over the past three decades.  
 
The Spratly Islands are located between 4 0 and 110 30’ latitude and 1090 30’ and 
1170 50’ longitude along the wide expanse of the South China Sea and spread across the 
world's busiest sea lanes. This group of islands consists of more than 100 small groups of 
islets, coral reefs and sandbars; with some of them visible only during the low tide.3 The 
waters around these islands include rich fishing grounds, phosphate deposits, and 
potentially natural gas and oil deposits. As of the implementation of the 1982 United 




                                                 
1 1996 Encyclopaedia Britannica (CD Resource)  
2 Bob Catley and Makmur Kelliat, Spratlys: The dispute in the South China Sea (Sydney: Ashgate, 1997), p. 3. 
Also see map for the location of these groups of island 
3 Renato Cruz De Castro, “China’s Strategic Modernization and its Implication on RP-PRC Spratly Dispute,” 
APAN Occasional Papers,  available at http://www.apan-
info.net/ndcp/occasional_papers/HTML/Rene%20Castro%27s%20Paperwp.htm   (10/3/03) 
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Figure 1: The South China Sea Islands 
Source: Federation of American Scientists: Military Analysis Network available at 
http://cat.middlebury.edu/southchinasea/maps/schina_sea_88.jpg (10/30/03) 
 3 
zone (EEZ) of 200 nm.  The Spratlys Islands region has turned into a region of disputes 
where six nations scramble to occupy the areas to reap the potential economic benefits. 
Three nations -- China, Taiwan, and Vietnam -- claim the entire Spratly Islands, while 
portions are claimed by Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. Currently, approximately 
50 islands are occupied by China (about 450 soldiers), Malaysia (70-90), the Philippines 
(about 100), Taiwan (about 100) and Vietnam (about 1,500). Brunei is a claimant but 
does not occupy any island or reef. 4 Skirmishes between China and Vietnam occurred in 
1988 over the disputed island of Fiery Cross and between China and the Philippines in 
1995 over the Mischief Reef. Several others near clashes between Vietnam and the 
Philippines, and exchanges of harsh diplomatic notes between Malaysia and the 
Philippines and between China and Malaysia have occurred because of these competing 
claims. These nations have come close to war over the territory on several occasions in 
the recent years, and on August 2002 Vietnamese troops based on one islet fired warning 
shots at the Philippine air force reconnaissance plane. 
 
Currently, economic activity is limited to commercial fishing and mining of 
phosphate. The proximity to oil and gas-producing sedimentary basins suggests the 
potential for oil and gas deposits, but the region is largely unexplored, without any 
reliable estimates of potential reserves; viable commercial exploitation has yet to be 
developed because the depth of water is deep in the area. 
 
These disputes over sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction of the Spratlys remain 
potentially volatile and dangerous in the South China Sea today.  The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been engaging China, the most powerful claimant 
in the disputes since the early 1990s because of its subtle expansion and consolidation in 
the Spratlys.  Since then, a series of ASEAN-China informal consultations on the South 
China Sea have taken place to formulate a code of conduct.  Nonetheless, on November 
4, 2002 in Phnom Penh, a non-binding Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South  
                                                 
4 Figures of the troops stationed in these islands are obtained from CIA World Fact Book, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pg.html  (8/28/03). See Figure 1 for the details of 







Feature Geo- Location (lat/long) 
North East  
Name in Occupying Country 
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70 37’ 1130 56’ 
80 08’ 1140 42’   
70 59’ 1130 54’ 




Terumbu Layang Layang 







West York Island 
80 21.5’   1150 13.7’ 
100 49.5’ 1150 50’  
100 43’    1140 32’  
100 40’    1140 25.5’  
100 44’    1150 48.5’  
110 27.5’ 1140 21’  110 03.2’ 1140 
17’  









China Chigua Reef 
Cuateron Reef 
Fiery Cross Reef 
Gaven Reef 
Johnson Reef (S) 
Mischief Reef 
Subi Reef 
  90 55’     1140 29’  
  80 51.5’  1120 50’  
  90 33’     1120 53’ 
 100 12.5’ 1140 13’ 
 90 42.7’   1140 16.8’ 
 90 55’      1150 32’     








Taiwan Itu Aba Island  100 23’   1140 21.4’  Tai Ping Dao 
Vietnam Allison Reef 
Amboyna Cay 
Barque Canada Reef 
Bombay Castle 
(Rifleman Bank) 
Central Reef  
Collins Reef 
(Johnson Reef-N) 
Cornwallis South Reef 











Prince Consort Bank 
Sand Cay 
Sin Cowe Island 






  80 49’    1140 06’  
  70 53.8’ 1120 55’ 
  80 10’    1130 18’ 
  70 56’    1110 40’  
 
  80 55’    1120 21’  
  90 45’    1140 13.7’ 
 
  80 43’    1140 11’ 
 100 55’   1130 51’ 
  80 49’    1120 36’    
   70 47’   1100 28’ 
   70 33’   1110 35’ 
   80 37’   1110 40’ 
   90 46’   1160 43.8’ 
  100 11’  1140 22’ 
 700 42’   1140 22’ 
   80 57’   1130 40.5’  
100 24.5’ 1140 35’ 
  80 51.8’   140 39.2’ 
  70 53’    1100 00’   
100 22.7’ 1140 28.7’  
 90 53.2’  1140 19.7’ 
 90 54.8’  1140 33.5’  
110 23.2’  1140 17.9’  
110 25.8’  1140 19.7’  
  80 38.5’  1110 55’  
  70 31.7’  1090 43.7’  
  80 51’     1120 12’  
Bai Toc Tan 
Dao An Bang 
Chaw Shai/Chan Chai  
--- 
 
Con Guia/Trong Sa Dong 
Bai Vung May/Co Lin  
 
Da Nui Le/Nut’le 
Da Lon 
Con Dong/Da Dong 
Bai Que Duong 
--- 
Da Lat  
--- 
Nam Yit/Nam Yet  
--- 
Hon Sip/Hon Sap 
Do Thi 
Da Tien Nu 
Bai Phuc Nguyen 
Da Son Ca 
Dao Sinh Ton/Gac Ma 
Sinh Ton Dong 
Da Nam 
Dao Song Tu Tay 
Dao Truong Sa 
Bai Tu Chinch 
Con Tay/Da Day 
 
Figure 2: Islands Occupied by Claimant States in the Spratly Islands 
 
* Vietnam reportedly sent troops to occupy two additional submerged reefs in the Spratly Islands (probably Orleana 
Shoal and Kingston Shoal on Rifleman Bank) in September 1998, however, there had been no firm information on 
these actions. In comparison, Malaysia’s move to construct new facilities at Investigator Shoal in June1999 was well 
documented. 
Sources: Dan J. Dzurek, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who’s on First?, Maritime Briefing 2;1 (Durham, U.K: 
International Boundaries Research Unit [IBRU], University of Durham, 1996) Table 2: 56-57; and Rigoberto Tiglao, 
”Seaside Boom,” Far Eastern Economic Review  (July 8,1999):14. , and John C. Baker and David G. Wiencek, eds., 
Cooperative Monitoring in the South China Sea, (Westport, Connecticut London: Praeger 2002), p 193-194 
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China Sea was formally signed between ASEAN and China, rather than a code of 
conduct that ASEAN originally desired.5 
 
B.  THESIS  
  
 This thesis focuses on the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea. Its purpose is to assess whether the declaration, together with the current initiatives 
taken by ASEAN (namely, the official Track I and unofficial Track II confidence-
building measures) are able to bind or prevent the disputes from escalating into flash 
points while preventing further skirmishes from recurring. This thesis examines whether 
Track I ASEAN summits, ASEAN ministerial meetings (AMM) and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) and Track II informal workshop on managing potential conflicts 
in the South China Sea (known as the workshop) and the Council for the Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) possess adequate confidence-building 
measures to manage the problems these competing claims have created. 
 
C. AIM OF THE THESIS 
  
 This thesis will seek answers to the following questions: 
(1) Why do states claim the Spratly Islands? 
(2) Can claimants provide security to their claims, and what is their political 
will with regards to this claim? 
(3) Can the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
prevent the situation from escalating into a flash point? 
(4) Can the Track I and II confidence-building measures mechanism prevent 
the escalation of the competing claims? 
 
                                                 
5 “China Signs Accord with Asian Group on Disputed Territory, Free Trade,” Washington Post, 5 November 2002 
 6 
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
  The main focus of the thesis will concentrate on the Declaration of the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea and whether ASEAN’s multilateral institutions will be 
able to build confidence and resolve or manage the conflict so that it does not develop 
into a potential flash point in the South China Sea.  This thesis examines the background 
of the Spratlys competing claims and the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea. It further explains the events leading to China’s signing of the 1976 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the South China Sea (TAC) in the ASEAN-China 
Bali Summit on October 9, 2003.   
  
E. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
  
 Chapter II examines the origin of the 1982 UNCLOS and some of the relevant 
International Laws governing the usage of the maritime areas, the historical background 
of the competing claims of the Spratlys, and the economic potential and the strategic 
value of the Spratlys.  Chapter III investigates whether the claimants can sustain their 
claims using their present military capabilities, and it assesses the claimants and the 
political will to maintain what the nations have claimed.  Chapter IV examines the 
genesis of the code of conduct and its principles, determines the advantages of signing 
the conduct, and estimates whether the claimants will be able to utilize the conduct of 
parties to prevent further incident from occurring.  In addition, ASEAN’s Track I and II 
confidence building mechanisms will be discussed to evaluate them in the light of 
multilateral theory. This chapter also discusses the roles played by the United States and 
Japan in these competing claims. Chapter V concludes with a judgment whether the 
signing of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea will enable these regional 










The instability created by the overlapping claims on the Spratly Islands is the 
cause for concern among Southeast Asian nations who wondered whether these claims 
could destabilize the regional security that the region has enjoyed thus far. China, 
Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have each laid competing claims 
on the Spratly Islands on the basis of history, discovery, established laws and effective 
occupation. All the competing countries have occupied some of the islands with the 
exception of Brunei.  China, Vietnam and the Philippines fought each other over their 
claims in the late 80s and mid 90s. The actions taken by China over this issue in the past 
two decades, coupled with the ongoing modernization of its naval and air assets, suggests 
that, China will eventually emerge as the main actor in the region. In response to this 
issue, bilateral agreements and codes of conduct have been signed between China and 
Vietnam and between China and the Philippines. These agreements and codes, however, 
have not stopped China and the Philippines from fighting a few months later after the 
signing of the code of conduct in 1995.  In the November 2000 issue of Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, Clive Schofield asserts that “the South China Sea disputes and the 
Spratlys disputes in particular, remain the principal source of tension in Southeast Asia. 
There is a genuine fear that ongoing incidents could escalate to actual confrontation.” 
 
This chapter discusses the origin of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea 
Conference (UNCLOS) and some of the relevant international laws governing the usage 
of the maritime areas.  With the implementation of the 1982 UNCLOS, nations utilized it 
to exercise their claims, which have contributed to the conflicts in the Spratly Islands.  
The chapter also discusses the background of each nation’s claim drawing some 
conclusions as to whether the claim is legitimate or in accordance with the relevant laws.  
The economic and strategic potential of the Spratly Islands is also discussed in order to 
determine why these nations claim the areas.  
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B. THE 1982 UNCLOS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS  
 
1.   Origins  
 
Prior to the mid-1960s, the law of the sea developments focused primarily on the 
rights of nations to act unilaterally in exploiting resources. In the absence of specific 
maritime laws governing the usage of the sea and the exploitation of its resources, the 
1958 Continental Shelf Convention, Customary Laws and International Laws were often 
used for arbitration and judgments in the International Tribunals and International Court 
of Justice6 for those cases pertaining to maritime issues.  With the increasing importance 
and utilization of the sea as means of commerce and trade, a dire need arose for 
formulated agreements adequately covering all maritime issues.  Interpretations of the 
laws governing the limits of territorial waters and their usage, for example, caused 
disputes among nations; some assumed the customary cannon ball rule, and others 
observed the 3 nm or 12 nm limits7 to justify their actions.   
 
The call for a concerted effort and common regulations governing the utilization 
of oceans was initiated by the Maltese ambassador to the United Nations in November 
1967. In December 1970, the United Nations General Assembly decided that there was a 
need to formalize regulations that governed the usage of the sea and the exploitation its 
resources.  Several resolutions were passed, and Resolution 2749 -- containing the 
“Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil 
Thereof beyond the limits of National Jurisdiction”8 -- initiated the deliberation of the 
1982 UNCLOS.  This conference signaled the beginning of a new era, when for the first 
time attention was paid at the international level to all matters relating to the laws of the 
                                                 
6 One such example is the Fishery Jurisdiction Case between United Kingdom and Iceland 17 August 1972, 
available at http://www.icj.law.gla.ac.uk/idecisions/isummaries/ibiaisummary720817.htm  (6/5/03) 
7 Most nations including the U.S recognized the 3 nm before the implementation of the 1982 UNCLOS. There 
was resistance to the 12 nm territorial limit prior to the implementation of the 1982 UNCLOS 
8 This was taken from the Agreement made in the Final Act of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea 
available at, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/final_act_eng.pdf  (6/3/03) 
 9 
sea, while considering  the problems of the ocean space and its resources.  Debate started 
in 1973, resulting in the 1982 UNCLOS after three deliberations, which ended nine years 
later in Montego Bay, Jamaica on the December 10, 1982.  The Convention was opened 
for ratification in 1982, but it did not come into force until the sixtieth nation, 
Madagascar, ratified it on November 16, 1994.9   
 
C. THE RELEVANCE OF THE 1982 UNCLOS  
 
The law of the sea convention provides a framework governing the rights and 
obligations of nations with regards to ocean space and its resources. All the claimant 
nations involved in the Spratlys have ratified the 1982 UNCLOS with the exception of 
Taiwan since Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations. Under the 1982 UNCLOS, 
a nation exercising territorial sovereignty over an island can declare a territorial sea 
extending 12 nm from the island baseline.10 The sovereignty of the controlling nation 
extends to the air space above and the seabed and subsoil of the territorial sea.11  
Additionally, a sovereign nation exercising territorial sovereignty over an island can 
declare a 200 nm Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) from the island’s baseline. Within the 
EEZ, the controlling nation has sovereign rights over the natural resources located in the 
water, sea bed and sub soil. 12 With these provisions in force along with other related 
international law, coupled with the potential wealth the sea provides and the strategic 
location of the Spratly Islands, claimant nations moved to exercise sovereignty over the 
Spratly Islands.  
                                                 
9 The 1982 UNCLOS Preamble 
10 The 1982 UNCLOS Part VIII Article 121 Regime of Islands 
11 The 1982 UNCLOS Part II Article 2 (2), Legal Status of the Territorial sea, of air space and of its bed and 
subsoil 
12The 1982 UNCLOS Part V Article 55 -57,  Specific legal regime of the EEZ; Rights, Jurisdiction and Duties of 
the Coastal State in the EEZ  and Breath of the EEZ 
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D. CLAIMANT NATIONS 
 
 Issues of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands started when the British and French 
exerted their influence in the region during the 1800s. As their empires collapsed after 
World War I and World War II, a series of power vacuums occurred.  Competing claims 
to the Spratly Islands began to first attract international attention towards the end of the 
nineteenth century as Britain, France, Japan and China competed with one another over 
sovereign control of the Spratly Islands. As these powers began to withdraw from the 
region, other regional nations joined in the competing claims.   
 
The greatest difficulty in determining the legitimacy of each claim is identifying 
the common criteria and norms with which nations can make their claims. Currently, 
China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the entire Spratly archipelago as their historical 
heritage; whereas, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei each claim sovereignty over part 
or all of the Spratly Islands on the basis of discovery and effective occupation according 
to international legal principles or the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS.  
 
E.   CHINA’S CLAIM 
  
China’s claim to the entire South China Sea is historically based. The Chinese 
Foreign Ministry published an article entitled “Jurisprudential Evidence to Support 
China’s Sovereignty over Nansha Islands (Chinese name for Spratlys)” in 2000.13 It 
states that its claim is based on three principles: discovery, development productive 
activities, and exercised jur isdiction by the Chinese government.  The article further 
states that Chinese discovered the islands as early as the Han Dynasty. This evidence was 
recorded in books; Records of Rarities by Yang Fu of the Eastern Han Dynasty, Records 
of Rarities in Southern Boundary by Wan Zhen of the Three Kingdoms Period and A 
History of Phnom by General Kang Tai of the East Wu State. Regarding the development 
of the islands, the article stated that Chinese fishermen had used the islands as their base 
to “develop and engage fishing, planting and other productive activities” since the Jin 
                                                 
13 “Jurisprudential Evidence to Support China’s Sovereignty over Nansha Islands.” China Foreign Ministry 
Article, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5773.html  (6/8/03)  
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Dynasty.14 The Chinese government collected taxes from these fishermen exercising 
jurisdiction over these islands.  Maps and other historical records record the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the successive governments of China over the Spratly Islands and 
recognized these islands as Chinese territories.  
 
China’s earliest formal claim can be traced back to the signing of the Convention 
Respecting the Delimitation of the Frontier between China and Tonkin on  June 26,1887, 
which concluded the Sino-French War if 1884-85.15  Article 3 of this convention 
provided a delimitation line between French and Chinese territorial claims to the South 
China Sea. Chinese officials have cited Article 3 as giving China ownership and control 
of the Spratly Islands in the nineteenth century and the early 1900.16  
 
China’s arguments on effective occupation are based on the events in the 20th 
century.  China claimed that the Chinese government had sovereignty over the Spratly 
Islands throughout the 1930s and 1940s.17  When Spratly Islands were annexed by 
France in 1930 and 1933, China protested and reiterated its claim. From 1947 to 1950, 
after the Japanese surrendered the islands and again from 1956 until present day, Ta iwan 
has controlled the Japanese submarine base and currently maintained an armed garrison 
in the island of Itu Aba, the largest island in the group.  Beijing has incorporated the 
Spratly Islands into Guandong and Hainan provinces successively after the founding of 
the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and it claimed that the Chinese government has 
maintained sovereignty over the islands since. 
 
In its 1992 Territorial Sea Law, China claimed 12 nm territorial seas around the 
Spratly Islands, but it has never made any specific claims for an exclusive economic zone 
                                                 
14 Ibid 
15 Xavier Furtado. “International Law and the Dispute over the Spratly Island: Whither UNCLOS?” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Dec 1999, p. 389-40  
16 Ibid p. 340 
17 Liselotte Odgaard, Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia, (England: Ashgate Publishing 
Company 2002), p 88 
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or continental shelf around its claimed features.18 China enacted its continental shelf laws 
and exclusive economic zone in 1998.19In 2000, the Chinese Foreign Ministry published 
an article titled “International Recognition of China's Sovereignty over the Nansha 
Islands.”20 In this article China claimed that various nations have acknowledged and 
recognized the Nansha Islands as Chinese territory.  It further asserts that international 
public opinion and publications of other countries recognize the Nansha Islands as 
Chinese territory as well. 
 
However, Liselotte Odgaard argues that “China did not exercise jurisdiction, 
military or otherwise over the Spratlys before 1988.”21 Because of the difficulty of 
providing evidence of “effective occupation in ancient times, the fact that the concept of 
effective occupation did not exist in the Confucian legal system negates the existence of 
effective occupation prior to 1988.”22    Lian A. Mito states that China’s argument is 
“weak and the historical evidence fails to provide conclusive proof of routine occupation 
and at most supports only a claim of inchoate title.”23  Christopher C. Joyner argues that 
“the fundamental question of whether proof of historical title today carries sufficient legal 
weight to validate acquisition of territory.”24 He further argues that “modern international 
law clearly recognizes that mere discovery of some territory is not sufficient to vest the 
discoverer[’s] valid title of ownership to territory.”  However, Lee Lai To implies that 
China has adequate historical records, maps and cultural relics to support its historical 
                                                 
18 Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig. Sharing the resources of the South China Sea.  
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1997), p 24 
19 “A code of Conduct for the South China Sea.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 27 October 2000. available at 
http://www.janes.com/regional_news/asia_pacific/news/jir/jir001027_1_n.shtml (5/22/03) 
20 “International Recognition of China's Sovereignty over the Nansha Islands.” China Foreign Ministry Article, 
available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5766.html (6/8/03) 
21 Ibid Liselotte Odgaard (2002 p. 92) 
22 Roque Jr., R. Harry L. “China Claim to the Spratly Island Under International Law.” Journal of Energy and 
National Resources Law, (August 1997), 15:3 p 189-211, quoted in Liselotte Odgaard, Maritime Security between 
China and Southeast Asia, (England: Ashgate Publishing Company 2002), p 92 
23 Lian A. Mito. “The Timor Gap Treaty as a Model for Joint Development in the Spratly.” American University 
International Law Review,  Rev. 727,  Spring 1998 
24 Christopher C. Joyner. “The Spratly Islands: What Role for Normalizing Relations between China and 
Taiwan?” New England law Review, Rev. 819, Spring 1998  
 13 
claims to these islands.25  Andrew Forbes, a British scholar who has done extensive 
research into Chinese expeditions and the history of the South China Sea did not find any 
evidence of the Chinese explorers mentioning the Spratlys; he only found mention of the 
Paracels Islands.26 Forbes points out that no one paid much attention to the Spratlys until 
World War II,  when control over the sea lanes between East and Southeast Asia became 
strategically important when the Japanese used the islands as a staging point for it 
military. 27 
 
Analyzing the facts thus far in the case of China, there appears to be gaps in its 
occupation of the Spratlys during different historical periods when China was engaged in 
various internal and civil wars.  I would argue that China effectively occupied the 
Spratlys only after the 1974 and 1988 clashes with Vietnam where it wrested control of 
the islands from the Vietnamese. In a more recent case, in 1995 China forced the 
Philippines out of the Mischief Reefs after a brief clash. The legitimacy of China’s 
occupation in the Spratly Islands is questionable and is challengeable since I have carried 
out extensive patrol in this area in the late 1970s and early 1980s while serving aboard 
ship. These islands not only provide shelter for the Chinese fishermen but also for other 
fishermen of the region. 28 The islands have also acted as an area where fishermen 
recuperate after spending days at sea.  Therefore China’s argument of effective control 
may not be acceptable and its claim based on history also appears to be weak due to 
inconclusive collection of historical arguments in its claim. Besides this, five other 
nations are claiming the areas, which also weakens China’s claim for these five nations 
do not agree with China’s assertion of sovereignty.  
                                                 
25 Lee Lai To. China and the South China Sea Dialogue, (Westport, Connecticut London: Praeger 1999), p 9 
26 Paracel Islands is another group of islands situated approximately 100 nm North West of the Spratly group 
which is claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam  
27 The Japanese have used the Island of Itu Aba as their staging areas during the WW II and it has assisted the 
Japanese in their campaign in Southeast Asia 
28 I have carried out extensive patrols in the area since the late 1970s in the Spratlys area.  It is common to see 
Filipinos, Taiwanese, Vietnamese and Malaysian fishermen taking shelter in these islands especially when the hit by 
rough weather for some of their fishing vessels are only about 30-40 feet  
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F.   TAIWAN’S CLAIM 
 
Taiwan calls itself as Republic of China and has historically claimed to be the 
legitimate government of all of China. Taiwan's claim to the Spratly Islands is argued in 
the same manner as China's claim is based on historical discovery and the utilization of 
the islands.29  In addition, Taiwan claims that after the Japanese invaded Hainan Island, 
the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands in 1939, the Japanese placed the Spratly 
Islands under Taiwan's jurisdiction. 30 In 1948, Taiwanese troops were withdrawn to fight 
the Communist forces in the mainland and were redeployed to Itu Aba in 1956 and have  
remained there ever since.   
 
Taiwan has gone further than China on the issue of maritime boundary 
declaration. In 1979, Taiwan declared a 12 nm of territorial sea and a 200 nm EEZ. In 
1990, the Executive Yuan approved Itu Aba to be placed under the temporary jurisdiction 
of the municipal government of Kaoshiung, Taiwan’s southern most city. 31  In October 
1992, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense declared a 4,000 meter prohibited sea zone 
and a 6,000 meter restricted air zone to enforce effective control over Itu Aba.32 The 
Taiwanese parliament passed the bill on the country’s territorial waters and adjacent areas 
in January 1998; it was declared that seagoing vessels would be subjected to observations 
and inspection. 33 The Taiwanese draft law on maritime issues touches upon the historic 
waters concept.  The draft Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law mentions that the 
“Taiwanese’s historical waters and its area shall be promulgated by the Executive Yuan”, 
but the draft of the “Economic Exclusive Zone and Continental Shelf does not contain 
specific reference to the Spratlys.”34  
                                                 
29 Ibid  Mark J. Valencia el at (1997, p 29)   
30 Ibid  Lian A. Mito. (Spring 1998) 
31 Lin Cheng-yi, “Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy.” Asian Survey, Vol. 37. No. 4. April 1997  available at 
http://www.ic.ucsc.edu/~poli163/Lin.html  6/3/03 
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid 
34 Ibid  
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Taiwan's claims to the Spratlys mirror those of the PRC, Christopher C. Joyner35 
and Lin Cheng-yi36 agreed that the Taiwanese government based its claim on 
longstanding historic ties to the islands although it only has control over Pratas (Tungsha) 
and Itu Aba (Taiping) Islands. Mark Valencia noted that to strengthen its effective 
control, Taiwan has planned to build a 6,500-foot runway, an air terminal, a lighthouse 
and a fishing port on Itu Aba.37 Lian A. Mito argues that Taiwan's claim is based upon 
the same historical evidence as China's and thus suffers from the same weaknesses, 
attributable to unconvincing and intermittent proof. 38 He further states that Taiwan may, 
however, have a strong claim to Itu Aba Island, which it has continuously occupied since 
1956.39  Xavier Furtado states that “Taiwan has been exercising effective administration 
and control over some of the islands in the Spratly Islands ever since 1956 and not since 
1948.”40   
 Most Chinese scholars claimed that Taiwan has met the requirement found in the 
Isle of Palmas arbitration41 for it has been effectively exercising sovereignty over Itu Aba 
Island since 1956.  In my opinion, Taiwan historical claim suffers the same weaknesses 
as China, whereas, it has provided proof of effective occupation over Itu Aba and has 
maintained military presence on the island since the Japanese evacuated the island after 
                                                 
35 Ibid Christopher C. Joyner (Spring 1998) 
36 Ibid Lin, Cheng-yi. (1997) 
37 Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig. Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea. (The 
Hague: University of Hawaii Press 1997), p 29, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Oct 1993 at 47, Taiwan Eyes 
Spratly for Airport, Tourism, Honolulu Star Bulletin, Jan 24, at A8  
38 Ibid Lian A. Mito (Spring 1998) 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid Xavier Furtado (1999 p 390) 
41 The Palmas Island case concerned an inhabited island, but the analysis given by Max Huber, the 
arbitrator to this dispute between the United States and the Netherlands, reinforces the principle that less is 
required to acquire ownership of uninhabited places.  The United States based its claim on Spain's earlier 
"discovery" and the island's "contiguity" or proximity to the main Philippine islands (which were then a 
colony of the United States).  The Netherlands (which then controlled Indonesia) invoked its contact with 
the region and its agreements with native princes.  The arbitrator favored the Dutch, based on their peaceful 
and continuous display of authority over Palmas.  Spain's "discovery" did not confer title because it was not 
accompanied by any subsequent occupation or attempts to exercise sovereignty. Quoted fro m Jon M. Van 
Dyke article “Legal status of islands – with reference to article 121(3) Of the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea” available at http://www.hawaii.edu/law/faculty/publications/KoreanPaper-Islands12999.htm  
(6/13/03) 
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World War II. 42  Taiwan has not forcefully evicted other nations from any of its claimed 
island to exercise effective occupation. The legal status of Taiwan places Taiwan in an 
awkward position; because of this status, it is difficult for Taiwan to be effectively 
involved in resolving the competing claims with the other nations multilaterally. 
Furthermore, Taiwan is not a signatory to the 1982 UNCLOS, which questions whether 
all its legislations pertaining territorial limits, EEZ and restricted air and sea zone are 
legally binding or are subjected to closer scrutiny.  Taiwan, in my opinion, has exercised 
effective occupation over Itu Aba over the last forty odd years, so it could argue its case 
if being arbitrated. 
 
G.   VIETNAM’S CLAIM  
 
Vietnam claims the entire Spratly archipelago while occupying at least 25 islands, 
reefs, and cays.  Similar to that of China and Taiwan, Vietnam based its claim on 
historical heritage to the area.  Vietnam argues that Vietnamese Emperors had effectively 
administered the Spratly archipelago since the 1800s. Vietnam has produced historical 
maps from that period showing the Spratlys to be under control of Vietnam. 43 In addition, 
its government records describe the islands and its expeditions to retrieve treasures from 
sunken ships.44 In 1884, the French established protectorate over Vietnam and began to 
assert claim over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. From 1933-1939, France had physical 
control over nine of the Spratly Islands and published a formal notice of annexation in its 
own official Journal on July 26, 1933. 45  
 
Vietnam asserted it claims at an international level, including meetings of the 
World Meteorological Organization, the 1951 Peace Conference in San Francisco, and as 
                                                 
42 Hsiao Shi-Ching. “The Nansha (Spratly) Disputes.” Chinese Culture XXXV:1, 1994 , p 41-85 quoted in  
Liselotte Odgaard, Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia, (England: Ashgate Publishing Company 
2002), p 88 
43 Ibid Xavier Furtado (1999 p 392) 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid Mark J. Valencia el at (1997 p 30) 
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part of the Geneva agreements for the return of Vietnam by France.46  Even after the 
Chinese invasion of the Paracels in 1974, Vietnam did not relinquish its claims to either 
island group and chose to maintain 22 features in the Spratlys to support its claims of 
effective occupation with troops.  The main garrison is situated on Sin Cowe Island and is 
fortified with heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns.  Spratly Island also has a small 
airstrip.47  All these fortifications enhance Vietnam claim of effective occupation. 
 
Official statements made in 1956 by North Vietnamese Second Foreign Minister 
Ung Van Khiew and by its Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in 1959 acknowledged 
Chinese authority over the Spratly,48 which weakens Vietnam’s argument based on 
history. In 1967, South Vietnam issued a proclamation affirming that the subsoil and 
seabed of the continental shelf adjacent to Vietnamese territorial waters, together with all 
the natural resources contained therein and thereon, came under the exclusive jurisdiction 
and direct control49 of the Vietnamese government. In 1970, a by- law regulating the 
exploration for and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources was enacted and, in 1972, a 50 
nm fishing zone was declared.50  In 1977, after the fall of South Vietnam, a unified 
Vietnam issued a statement on maritime jurisdiction confirming the 12 nm limits of 
territorial sea, a 12 nm contiguous zone was established ‘to see to its security and 
interest’ and a 200 nm EEZ was also established.51  
Liselotte Odgaard states that Vietnam bases its claim to territory in the Spratlys 
on four arguments, discovery, effective occupations, recognition and proximity52. No 
strong evidence exists to support the discovery claim. Whereas as for the effective 
occupation it is based on the French history of occupation when the French occupied the 
Spratlys in 1933 when the islands were maintained as part of the French administration of 
                                                 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid p. 31 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid Liselotte Odgaard (2002  p 95) 
50 Ibid 
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid p 94 
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the colonial state of Vietnam. The Japanese forced France to give up the islands in 1939 
when Japan began their conquest in Southeast Asia. Vietnam was represented at the San 
Francisco Peace Conference; it used this occasion to claim sovereignty to the Spratlys. 
The Vietnamese point out that no one protested against its claim to sovereignty; 
therefore, it assumes a universal recognition of its sovereignty over these islands.53 In 
order to substantiate the claim of effective occupation, ten features were incorporated into 
the administrative system of South Vietnam by assigning them to the Phuoc Tuy province 
in 1956; however, military presence was not established.54  Vietnam, nonetheless, may 
have a legitimate 350 nm continental shelf claim to the western part of the Spratly area, 
since its continental shelf appears to be a shallow and natural prolongation of the land 
territory. 55 
 
Omar Saleem states that Vietnam's claim is based on two theories. First, Vietnam 
claims that it has exercised historical dominion and control over the Spratly Islands, 
dating back to 1650 to 1653.56  Notwithstanding the fact that the government of North 
Vietnam had concurred with Chinese claims of sovereignty over the Islands in the 1950s, 
the reunited Vietnam reasserted its claim to the entire archipelago. Vietnam argues that 
its right to the Spratly Islands vested at the San Francisco Allied-Japanese Peace 
Conference in 1951 when Japan relinquished all right to the islands and Vietnam asserted 
its claim.57  
 
Second, Vietnam claims a right to the Spratly Islands because the Islands are 
within its continental shelf. 58  Whereas, Lian A. Mito mentions that Vietnam's claim to 
the Spratly Islands is weak for four main reasons. First, Vietnam's historical claim, like 
                                                 
53 Ibid p 95 
54 Ibid 
55 Ibid p 97 
56 Omar Saleem. “The Spratly Islands Dispute: China Defines the New Millennium.” American University Law 




China's, suffers from evidentiary weaknesses;59 second, Vietnam did not succeed 
France's 1933 claim; third, there are significant lapses in Vietnamese control  over the 
Spratlys;60 and fourth, statements made by North Vietnamese government officials in 
1956 and 1959 support China's claim to the Spratlys. Mito further reiterated that despite 
these weaknesses, however, Vietnam has maintained garrisons on twenty-two Spratly 
features since 1973.  Lee G. Cordner61 agrees with Mito that Vietnam did not succeed 
France and that a period lapsed when Vietnam did not have effective control over the 
islands.  
 
In summary, I would argue that Vietnam’s historical claim is not strong and its 
weaknesses similar to that of China’s. The argument that the islands were inherited from 
the French too can be challenged for during that period China was occupying some of the 
islands. Furthermore, during its civil war years; evidence of effective occupation is absent 
and its open support for China’s claim further weakens its claim to the area. However, 
Vietnam’s claim that the islands are within its continental shelf may support its claims.  
In addition Vietnam has effectively occupied the 22 islands since 1973, which cannot be 
disputed because it has been there since then. 
 
H.  THE PHILIPPINES’S CLAIM 
 
The Philippines claims part of the Spratly Islands. Its formal interest in the Spratly 
Islands can be traced to the time when the Republic was born.  The earlier period of 
history of the Filipino people dated back to the Spanish or American colonial period 
indicates that there was knowledge of existence of the Spratlys then.  Filipino contacts 
with Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1800s are also known to have occurred against the 
backdrop of the Spanish and French Colonial conquests, when Filipinos were conscripted 
                                                 
59 Ibid Lian A. Mito (Spring 1998) 
60 Ibid 
61 Lee G. Cordner, “The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea.” 25 Ocean Development. & 
International Law. 61.  1994. p. 66 
 20 
into the Spanish navy to Vietnam in order to assist the French in suppressing the 
natives.62 
 
After the defeat of the Japanese in World War II, the newly independent 
government of the Philippines expressed interest and concern over the status of the 
islands west of Pahlawan, which had been under the Japanese occupation during the war.  
In September 1946, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Vice President Elipidio Quirino 
wrote to General Douglas MacArthur demanding the “New Southern Islands” or Shinnan 
Gunto as they were then known, be given to the Philippines.63  From 1947 to 1950, a 
Filipino mariner, Captain Filemon Cloma led a group of fishing vessels venturing further 
west of Pahlawan and discovered a vast fishing frontier, which Filemon’s brother Tomas 
Cloma later claimed as Freedomland.64  
 
In May 1956, Tomas Cloma led an expedition to survey the islands, which they 
had by then occupying for several months.  Later that year Cloma issued a “notice to the 
whole world” announcing a claim that he and his associates were making as citizens of 
the Philippines, over “the islands, sand cays,  sand bars, coral reefs, and fishing grounds 
with a total area of approximately 64,976 square nautical miles.”65  Cloma asserted that 
he had discovered territory that was not “res nullius” or without owner,66 which Japan 
had renounced in the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951.   This drew protests from 
China, Taiwan and Vietnam.  However, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was quoted to 
have said that he saw no reason why Freedomland should not be a part of the territory of 
the Philippines “by virtue of proximity or occupation.”67 
 
                                                 
62 Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, “The Kalayaan Islands (Spratly) in the Philippine Foreign Policy.” Panorama. 
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In the late 1960s, the Philippines began to set up military outposts to provide 
security to its fishermen who had been harassed by the Taiwanese that resided in Itu Aba.  
Since then the Philippines has occupied seven islands. In 1971, President Marcos 
organized a composite contingent of Filipino Army, Navy, constabulary and security 
personnel to be stationed in the area of the Spratlys.68 That same year at the 72nd Meeting 
of the United Nations Seabed Committee, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Jose Ingles 
issued a statement asserting the Philippines government’s effective occupation and 
control of the island group.  Later on June 11, 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1596 
mandated that the islands, cays, shoals and reefs be integrated into the Philippine 
administrative structures as the 12th municipality of Pahlawan province and renamed the 
area “Kalayaan Island Group.”69 Another Presidential Decree 1599 was issued the same 
day proclaiming a 200 nm EEZ for the Philippines.70 
 
Omar Saleem states that the Philippine’s claim to the Spratly Islands is based on 
economic need, proximity, and abandonment of rights by all other nations that led to 
Philippine discovery of the Islands in 1947.71 He further elaborates that following the war 
with Spain in 1898, the United States and Spain signed a treaty that among other things 
defined the "Philippine Islands" and transferred them to the United States. The treaty, 
however, neglected to include the Spratly Islands in this land transfer. Lian A. Mito 
argues that the Philippines claims are based upon the theory that the islands were “terra 
nullius” (without an owner) when a Filipino Tomas Cloma discovered them in 1947.72 
Mito further clarifies that the Philippines also contends that the Spratly Islands were terra 
nullius following the  1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, therefore, invalidating all 
previous claims of ownership and justifying its occupation. Lastly, the Philippines claim 
that the Spratly Islands lie within its archipelagic territory and are "vital to the country's 
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71 Ibid Omar Saleem. (2000) 
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security and economic survival."73 In 1978, the Philippines formally claimed the Spratly 
Islands by presidential decree. 
  
Analyzing the facts thus far, the Philippines arguably possesses the weakest 
claims to the Spratly Islands as agreed to by many scholars. The argument that the islands 
were unclaimed and unoccupied when Cloma "discovered" them in 1947 is unconvincing 
and highly unlikely for countries like China, Taiwan and Vietnam had already stationed 
its troops in the area prior to Cloma’s discovery. In addition, Cloma's discovery did not 
give rise to a claim of ownership on the part of the Philippine government since Cloma 
was acting as an individual without the sanction of the Philippine government then. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that Cloma's brief occupation of the Spratly Islands satisfies the 
Palmas Island standard of a continuous display of authority or an effective occupation. 
Lastly, the Spratly Islands are not located within the Philippines' archipelagic territory 
since the Pahlawan Trough separates the islands from the Philippine archipelago. Even 
though the Philippines suffers these weaknesses, its occupation on the seven features 
since 1978 may strengthen its claim under the Palmas Island standard.  
  
 
I.   MALAYSIA’S CLAIM 
 
Malaysia’s claim dates back to 1979 when that government published an official 
map encompassing the southern most of the Spratly Islands as part of the country’s 
continental shelf and EEZ. 74  Twelve features in the southern portion of the Spratly 
Islands, which Malaysia claimed, are located on its continental shelf. Currently Malaysia 
is occupying four of the islands and has built an air strip and a diving resort in the 
Swallow Reef which Malaysia renamed as Pulau Layang Laying. In a speech delivered 
by the Foreign Minister of Malaysia on September 2, 1999 regarding Malaysia’s latest 
claim to the Investigator Reefs, he reiterated that Malaysia’s claims are in accordance 
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74 The official map called the “Peta Baru” shows the Malaysian EEZ.  With this announcement the navy was 
given the task to patrol the claimed area  
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with the established laws and regulations of the 1982 UNCLOS and it is used for 
scientific research purposes.75 
 
Mark J, Valencia states that Malaysia asserts two legal bases for its claims: 
continental shelf extension and discovery/occupation. 76 Malaysia’s continental shelf 
claim arises out of the Geneva Convention of 1958 pertaining to Territorial Waters and 
Continental Shelf boundaries which Malaysia signed in 1960.  He states that Malaysia 
claims are difficult to justify under a continental shelf theory because neither the 1982 
UNCLOS nor Malaysia’s own Continental Shelf Act of 1966 indicate that the continental 
shelf pertains to land or rocks,77  and Article 76(1) of the 1982 UNCLOS refers to “the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend…[from a] natural prolongation of 
its land to the outer edge of the continental shelf margin.”78 As for the claim of 
occupation, Valencia notes that Malaysia’s claim is on uncertain footing because its 
occupation and exploitation are relatively recent and have been vigorously contested by 
other nations.  
 
Mito states that Malaysia's claim lacks strength for several reasons. First, 
Malaysia's interpretation of the 1982 UNCLOS is incorrect. While the 1982 UNCLOS 
does allow a coastal state to control the resources of it s continental shelf, none of the 
provisions grant sovereign rights to a coastal state over islands located on its continental 
shelf.79   Second, Malaysia's 1979 claim of discovery and occupation is fairly recent, as 
compared to China, Taiwan, and Vietnam's claims, and further more it is challenged by 
several countries in the region. Lastly, other countries control   several of the features 
claimed by Malaysia. However, he believes that Malaysia's claim to the four features it 
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has occupied since the 1980s may possess more legal strength under the Palmas 
standard.80 
 
Liselotte Odgaard contends that Malaysia’s continental shelf claim may be 
acceptable under the international law as the claim extends 200 nm from the coast of 
Sabah and Sarawak whereas she agrees that the argument of effective occupation is 
uncertain because Malaysia’s occupation and exploitation is recent and contested and it 
only controls some of the features for which it lays claim. 81  
  
Having discussed the facts in Malaysia’s claim, the islands and features that 
Malaysia claimed falls within the 200 nm of the continental shelf as stipulated in Article 
76 of the 1982 UNCLOS, thus making the claim an acceptable argument.  The question 
of effective occupation, even though it is relatively new, it can be argued that it further 
strengthens when a resort and diving center opened its door to the public in the late 
1980s. A marine research center was established at the same time. Malaysia has 
maintained a continuous patrol using its air and maritime assets in the area to exercise its 
claims and has continuously maintained its troops in the islands since 1979 to support this 
argument. 
 
J.   BRUNEI’S CLAIM 
 
Brunei currently claims two reefs, the Louisa Reef and Rifleman Bank, both 
located in the southern portion of the Spratly Islands, based on the belief that these 
features are located on an extension of its continental shelf.82  Brunei published a map in 
1988 extending its continental shelf to an area of 350 nm. 83  The boundaries which 
Brunei claim can be traced back to a 1954 decree by Britain declaring the boundaries of 
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its Borneo possessions to include “the area of the continental shelf … to the territorial 
waters.”84 Brunei claimed a 200 nm fishing zone in 1982 and a 200 nm EEZ in 1984.85 
 
Valencia and others argue that Brunei claims are weak for Louisa Reef has only 
two rocks that are above water at high tide and these features would certainly be 
classified as “rocks” under the 1982 UNCLOS; therefore, they would not have the 
capacity to generate an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf under Article 121(3) 
of the 1982 UNCLOS.86  He further reiterated that its claim to an extended continental 
shelf does not appear to be consistent with the requirements of the Law of the 1982 
UNCLOS because the East Pahlawan Trough interrupts the “natural prolongation” of the 
continental shelf 60 to 100 nm off Brunei.   Furthermore, Brunei has not attempted to 
apprehend or evict foreign fishing boats or vessels from the area it claims.87  
 
Mito states that Brunei relies on Articles 76 and 77 of the 1982 UNCLOS 88 and a 
1954 British decree establishing Brunei's maritime boundaries and unlike the other 
countries, Brunei does not  currently occupy any of the Spratly features.89 Liselotte 
Odgaard reiterated that a 350 nm continental shelf claim is not likely to be sustainable 
under the international law because of natural prolongation of the continental shelf is 
broken by the East Pahlawan Trough 60 to 200 miles off the coast.90 
  
The facts presented thus far do not favor Brunei in its claim on the two reefs. 
These reefs can only be visible during low tide and cannot support life on its own. 
Therefore these reefs do not generate a territorial sea or EEZ as stipulated in the 1982 
UNCLOS. The argument on prolongation of continental shelf also suffers setback since 
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the fault line is not continuous and it cannot be supported by Articles 76 or 77 of the 1982 
UNCLOS.  Brunei has not attempted to exert its influence in the area by either stationing 
its personnel in the reefs or evicting foreign fishermen frequenting the waters of the 
claimed area.  
  
K.   SUMMARY   
 
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei argue their claims 
based on historical evidence, discovery, effective occupation and proximity of the islands 
within the continental shelf complying with the established regulations and laws of the 
1982 UNCLOS and international laws. China’s, Taiwan’s and Vietnam’s historical 
evidence are inconsistent with unexplained gaps of conclusive proof that cannot be 
substantiated.  Furthermore whether historical title today carries sufficient legal leverage 
to validate acquisition of territory is a question that requires further in depth 
investigation.  Today’s modern international law clearly recognizes that mere discovery 
of some territory is not sufficient to entitle the discoverer valid title of ownership to 
territory.  As for effective occupation argument, all the nations involved in these 
competing claims, with the exception of Brunei, have exercised some form of effective 
occupation of the islands/reefs that they have occupied ranging from four decades to 
eight years. Does this duration qualify nation effective occupation? I am convinced that it 
needs other reasons and arguments to support and determine the effectiveness on a case 
by case basis.  
 
Since the implementation of the 1982 UNCLOS, countries utilized various 
articles stipulated in the 1982 UNCLOS to justify their claims.  Examining carefully each 
article is essential in determining whether the claim is legitimately sound. Article 76 of 
the Continental Shelf Law for example, has criteria that need to be met before a nation 
can claim that it has a continental shelf. Whereas, Articles 55-75 of the 200 nm Exclusive 
Economic Zone Laws allow a nation to generate an EEZ as long as the nation has a 
coastline. Article 121, “definition of rocks that cannot sustain life and economic 
activities” is use to counter argue by opposing claimants in some instances.  The EEZ 
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extends the sovereignty of the coastal state regarding the exploitation, conservation and 
management of hydrocarbon resources, fish resources and mineral resources to 200 nm. 
The consequences of these claims overlap in the Spratlys thus creating contentions 
between and among states.  
 
These competing claims are not only based upon different reasons but also upon 
different objectives and interests of these states.  Why would countries stake these claims 
and be willing to fight each other? I would argue that the main reason is to claim 
sovereignty and with this, nations can claim an EEZ that is stipulated in the 1982 
UNCLOS.  With an EEZ, exploitation of the rich resources can be carried out.  With the 
consumption of energy rising in the fast developing countries of Southeast and East Asia 
and with the available resources on land fast diminishing, countries are venturing further 
out to the sea to explore the possibilities of finding resources.  
 
Mark Valencia argues that with the 1982 UNCLOS implementation, maritime 
jurisdiction extension created an unstable geopolitical environment. States pursued their 
maritime and economic interests without much concern for their neighbors91. However, 
Stein Tonnesson argues that EEZ should not be seen as a right to sovereignty but as a 
right to exploit resources on and under the sea bed (continental shelf) and in the water 
(EEZ)92. Political scholars like Liselotte Odgaard and Lee Lai To 93 agree with this 
statement for each of them believe that claimant countries that stake their claims utilizing 
the 1982 UNCLOS argues that the 1982 UNCLOS gave legitimacy to their claims.  
However, my reasoning is that these claims can be contested because claimant nations 
justify and interpreted the established laws on these claims to their advantages.  Even 
though the 1982 UNCLOS stipulates all the conditions and rules to give nations 
legitimacy to their claims, sovereignty is not absolute when more than one nations 
                                                 
91 Mark J. Valencia, “Asia, the Law of the Sea and International Relations”, International Affairs, April 1997, p 
268 
92 Stein Tonnesson, “Vietnam’s Objective in the South China Sea: National or Regional Security?”, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 22 Issue 1, Apr 2000 p 199-220  
93 Ibid Lee Lai To, (1999 p 11) 
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claiming the same area.  In addition until all the nations involved are able to resolve these 
overlapping claims, each must exercise constraints to avoid the situation escalating into a 
conflict. The laws further expound that when contentions exists, avenues where these 
contentions can be arbitrated by an appointed Tribunal or the International Court of 
Justices are required, provided the contending parties agree to utilize these mechanisms.  
The difficulty in getting an agreement is obvious and the likelihood of a settlement may 
not be that easy because it involves six countries of varied political backgrounds and 
national interests.  Therefore, wha t are the courses of actions available then? When the 
likelihood of settlement is not forthcoming, there are avenues available where 
confidence-building measures that can enhance and prevent further clashes from 
recurring ought to be taken.  The signing of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties 
between ASEAN and China in November 2002 is a positive step taken to prevent 
escalation in the Spratly region.  
 
 L.   ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF SPRATLYS 
 
1. Oil and Natural Gas 
 
Oil and natural gas deposits have been found in most of the littoral states of the 
South China Sea. Currently China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have 
extracted oil and gas in their coastal waters and they believe that the Spratlys region is 
rich in these natural resources.  With Southeast and East Asia's economic growth rates 
among the highest in the world the increasing demand for energy to sustain this economic 
growth will be an unending requirement.   
 
There are claims stating that South China Sea oil and gas potential is as big as 
“the Second Persian Gulf.”94 If this claim is true, nations in contention will not be willing 
to forgo what they have claimed so far but they may increase their stake whenever an 
opportunity arises. However, according to Scott Snyder a study conducted in 1995 by 
                                                 
94 EIA D.O.E  Country Analysis Brief, “South China Sea Region,” September 2003  available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina.html 10/7/03 (10/7/03) 
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Russia's Research Institute of Geology of Foreign Countries, which estimated that “the 
equivalent of 6 billion barrels of oil might be located in the Spratly Islands area, of which 
70 percent would be natural gas which [is] far below the amount speculated.” 95 Craig 
Snyder states that in 1987, the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology conducted a 
geophysical survey in Spratlys and confirmed strong evidence of oil. And in the 1989 
follow-up survey through the South China Sea, “the Chinese estimated that the Spratlys 
held deposits of 25 billion cubic feet of natural gas, 370,000 tons of phosphorous and 105 
billion barrels of oil.” 96 Todd C. Kelly states that in 1994, Vietnamese estimated that the 
Spratly region has oil reserve equivalent 225 billion barrels of oil.97 However in an 
Energy Information Administration report in March 200298, it states that natural gas 
might be the most abundant hydrocarbon resource in the South China Sea. The U.S. 
Geological Survey indicates that about 60 to 70 percent of the region hydrocarbon 
resources are gas.  
 
David Rosenberg states that “over the next 20 years, oil consumption among 
developing East Asian countries is expected to rise by 4% annually on average, with 
about half of this increase coming from China. If this growth rate is maintained, oil 
demand for these nations will reach 25 million barrels per day and this demand will be 
more than double the current consumption levels by 2020.”99 He further went on to argue 
that industrial output and energy consumption has grown faster in the countries around 
the South China Sea than anywhere in around the world because of the region’s rapid 
economic growth and increasing population.  
                                                 
95 Scott Snyder, “The South China Sea Dispute Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy”, U.S. Institute of Peace 
Special Reports, 1997 available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/synder/South_China_Sea.html 
(4/27/03) 
96 Craig Snyder, “The Implications of Hydrocarbon Development in the South China Sea”, Center for 
International and Strategic Studies, Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, available at 
http://faculty.law.ubc.ca/scs/hdy.htm  (4/7/03) 
97 Todd C. Kelly. “Vietnamese Claims to the Truong Sa Archipelago [Ed Spratly Islands]” A Journal of Southeast 
Asian Sudies. Vol.3 Fall 1999. available at  http://www.hawaii.edu/cseas/pubs/explore/v3/todd.html (4/7/03) 
98 “South China Sea Report”, Energy Information Administration, March 2002, available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina2.html   (4/27/03) 
99 David Rosenberg, “The South China Sea”, Asian Studies Virtual Library,  available at 
http://www.middlebury.edu/SouthChinaSea/why.html  (4/18/03)  
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Lee Lai To revealed that a senior Chinese official predicted that China’s oil 
imports would hit 100 million tons a year by 2010, up from 16 million tons in 1993, 
unless China made some massive oil finds.100  The official further admitted that “for a 
considerable time China ’s oil import had been unable to provide sufficiently for the 
nation’s economic growth and that the situation could hardly change for the better if no 
new big oil fields were tapped.”101 Lee Jae-Hyung states that recent estimates of China’s 
oil imports are expected to rise from 1.4 million barrels of oil per day (bbl/d) in 2000 to 
three million bbl/d by 2010.102 
 
To fulfill such ambitious production goals, China has placed considerable 
importance on utilizing the resources of the South China Sea, especially potential oil and 
gas reserves, thus linking those resources to national economic development.103 Oil is a 
strategic resource of which China has been a net importer since 1993.  The increase in 
China’s territorial claims in the South and East China Seas and the importance of the sea 
lines of communication that connect to the oilfields of the Persian Gulf is vital to China’s 
economic growth. Besides China, other claimant nations also heavily depend on oil and 
gas as a revenue earner or as economic drivers. Therefore, to capture these resources will 
enhance a nation is productivity and decrease dependence of import for country like 
China.  Oil revenue for Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines will improve their 
economic growth in the long term.   
 
2.   Fish Resources 
 
Beside oil and gas, fishing remains an important economic activity for nationals 
from China, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines as these waters hold abundant supplies 
                                                 
100 Ibid Lee Lai To, (1999 p 11) 
101Ibid  
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of numerous fish species. This is the main source of food security in the region. With the 
proclamation of the EEZ, fishery disputes often erupted among claimant nations. 
Daojiong Zha argues that fishing is another major industry for countries like China, 
Vietnam and the Philippines.104   Scott Snyder, Brad Glosserman and Ralph A. Cossa105 
state that the sea provided “25 per cent of the protein needs for 500 million people; 80 per 
cent of Philippine diet alone. Over 5 tons of fish are harvested from the South China Sea 
each year; this constitutes 10 percent of the global fisheries catch and is also the world’s 
fifth top shrimp producer.” whereas, in a report by the Philippines Office of Strategic and 
Special Studies of Armed Forces of the Philippines posits that there are 314 fish species 
in the Spratlys region, of which 66 are commercially significant stocks.  At least 8 
percent of the world’s fish catch comes from the region for it straddles the path of yellow 
fin tuna migration. Tom Noess reported that fisheries in Southeast Asia accounted for 
some 23 percent of the total catch in Asia and 10 percent if the total world’s catch in 
1992.106 Liselotte Odgaard aptly put it that “following increasing demand for fish as a 
source of animal protein and export income, fishing activities in territorial seas and 
claimed EEZ will increased.”107 
 
The areas within the Spratlys regions are known to be rich fishing grounds. 
Fishing is a major industry for the claimant nations.  Besides being a revenue earner, it 
provides jobs while being a relatively cheap source of protein for its population. 
Therefore claimant nations scramble to occupy the islands in the area and promulgate an 
EEZ to exploit and capture this resource.  
 
                                                 
104 Daojiong Zha, “Writing Security in the South China Sea”, Columbia International Affairs Online 3/00  
available at http://www.cianet.org/isa/zha01/index.html  4/9/03  
105 Scott Snyder, Brad Glosserman and Ralph A.Cossa, “Confidence Building Measures in the South China Sea, 
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106 Tom Noess. “Environmental Cooperation around the South China Sea; The Experience of the South China 
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Vol.14 No. 4  2001 p 556 
107 Liselotte Odgaard, “Deterrence and Cooperation in the South China Sea”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
Vol.23, No.2, August 2001, p 297 
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3.   Minerals 
  
Beside oil, gas and fish resources, the Spratly Islands are also rich in guano and 
phosphate108 which the Chinese have been harvesting over the years. The German 
Chambers of Commerce March 2002 report states that the South China Sea is rich in tin, 
manganese, copper, cobalt and nickel. In the same report it states that the Chinese 
estimates that there are 370,000 tons of phosphorous in the Spratly regions.109   
 
The mineral potential of the Spratlys has not been exploited thus far due to the 
depth of the water in the region which requires high technology to mine these resources.  
Its economic potential cannot be ruled out without further exploration.  Guano and 
phosphate have been extracted in the region over the years by the Chinese and will 
encourage the claimants to protect their claims. 
 
Among the three economic potentials that have been discussed, oil and gas are the 
most promising potentials that generate higher returns currently.  I would argue that the 
disputed islands in the South China Sea assumed importance only after it was disclosed 
that potential sites of substantial offshore oil deposits existed. This initiated a scramble to 
occupy the Spratly region in the 1980s and early 1990s.  Even though the quantity being 
reported varies greatly, the possibility of finding oil and natural gas in the Spratly regions 
cannot be ruled out because in the adjacent areas, oil and natural gas have been extracted 
by Malaysia, Vietnam, China, Brunei and the Philippines. Two likely factors that prevent 
most foreign oil companies from taking the financial risk of carrying out the exploration 
necessary to determine whether the potential yields in the area are commercially viable 
are; one, the depth of waters varies greatly and two, the areas are subject to competing 
claims.  Furthermore foreign oil companies are not willing to be caught in the intricate 
web of contention and to take risk in the extraction of these potentials when security risks 
                                                 
108 Ibid Lee Lai To (1999 p 10) 
109 German Chambers of Commerce Report downloaded available at 
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are high. Besides oil and gas potential, the seas in the region are rich in fish resources.  
Therefore can claimant nations provide security to ensure safety of their fishermen and 
oil exploration companies?  The answer to this vital question will be discussed in Chapter 
III of this thesis. 
 
M.   SPRATLY’S STRATEGIC VALUE  
 
The Spratlys region’s strategic value is hard to estimate.  Many views stating 
different arguments and some argue that the uncharted waters in the areas are hazards to 
navigation and do not commensurate the strategic value it command.  In rebutting this 
notion, the Japanese used Itu Aba during World War II, as their staging area for many 
successful campaigns in Southeast Asia. 
 
1.   Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) 
 
Ji Gouxing argues that the Spratly Islands straddle the critical SLOC linking 
Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. He 
further states that “About 15 percent of the volume of world trade transits the Southeast 
Asian (SLOC).”110  Lee Lai To reiterated that the Spratlys straddle the major sea lanes 
between Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean and are adjacent to the Straits of Malacca. 
Control of the Spratlys would enable a state to monitor the movements of shipping in the 
area.111 Constance See, CDI research intern states that the SLOCs are crucial to the 
economic and security interests of ASEAN and the United States. She further reiterates, 
besides ASEAN, Japan, Taiwan South Korea and China are all important trading partners 
of the United States where the shipping routes are often describe as the arteries of the 
regional economy.  International Herald Tribune reported that 41,000 ships transited the 
South China Sea in 1999. This figure is estimated to rise with the economic situation 
improving in the region. 
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111 Ibid Lee Lai To (1999 p 10) 
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The South China Sea SLOCs form the economic lifeline of the nations in the 
region. Any disruption in the sea traffic flow will evidently disrupt the economies of the 
nations in the region. With the volume of shipping and trade passing through the SLOCs 
of the South China Sea, it is vital that the sea lanes remain open.  The scramble to control 
the islands in the Spratlys should, therefore, be regarded as an effort to protect the 
claimant nation’s economic interests.  
 
2.   Forward Defense or Forward Base 
 
Liselotte Odgaard argues that nations can utilize the islands as bases in forward 
defense structure and, at the same time, exert influences on the sea lanes to the west of 
Spratlys if nations are able to possess the islands that provide the vital links. 112  In 
another article, she argues that the “South China Sea constitute the first line of defense 
for the littoral states of Southeast Asia”. 113  Whereas Stein Tonnesson argues that the 
South China Sea is a semi-enclosed and has a double role.114 First, the sea forms a “sea-
bridge” between surrounding states.  Second, it is an international thoroughfare with 
crucial shipping routes from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific.  Omar Saleem notes that 
Japan used the Spratlys as a military outpost for both invasions and blockade during 
World War II.115  B. Rahman reiterated that in the Chinese perception, control over the 
South China Sea would constitute effective forward defense against intrusion that had 
historically come from the Southeast.116 
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3.   Surveillance Area 
 
In 1982, China’s third Navy Commander, Admiral Liu Huaqing put forward a, 
“offshore defense” strategy. 117  This strategy was finally endorsed by China’s historic 
resolution called “Strategic Changes in the Guiding Thoughts on National Defense,” 
which was adopted by the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission in June 
1985. 118 The South China Sea region is identified as one of the offshore defense areas 
and the control of these areas where surveillance and identification of all incoming air 
and surface threats can be conducted. The collision between a United States Navy 
surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter jet in April 01, 2001 demonstrates that the South 
China Sea area is used by nations to conduct surveillance and gathering information.  
According to Mark J. Valencia this incident is only a tip of an iceberg of mounting 
tension in the South China Sea.119  
 
4.   Additional Area to Support Population Growth 
 
Beside the oil factor and China’s energy needs to fuel its fast developing 
economy, some Chinese analysts feel that it is necessary to regain some of the maritime 
area in the South China Sea, because of China’s population increase, limited resources, 
and diminishing lebensraum in the future.  Maritime territories were considered to be a 
valuable asset for China’s sustained economic development and population growth. 120  
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5.  Meteorological and Marine Scientific Research Stations  
 
The openness of the area is an ideal area to carry out meteorological and marine 
research which claimant nations like China, Vietnam and Malaysia argue their claims. 
China further strengthened its stronghold in the Spratlys when a UNESCO conference in 
March 1987 requested Beijing to establish two meteorological stations in the Spratlys 
with a comprehensive global oceanic survey. 121  Malaysia in May 1999 claimed two 
reefs and established a marine scientific research center to carry out scientific research in 
marine science in these two outcrops.122 
 
Reviewing the facts presented, the strategic importance of the Spratly regions is 
difficult to ignore. The critical sea lanes linking Northeast Asia and the western Pacific to 
the Indian Ocean and the Middle East transverse the Spratlys regions. The SLOC is the 
main artery for the countries in the region and almost 80 percent of their maritime trade 
passes through the area.  Of importance is the SLOC remaining open and not being 
subjected to any disruption. If Spratly claimants threaten to inhibit freedom of navigation 
along adjacent international SLOCs, such actions will inevitably draw outside power like 
the United States into the conflict.  All claimants, including China, have taken great pains 
in assuring the world that their claims and actions in the Spratlys will remain consistent 
with international freedom of navigation protocols as stipulated in the 1982 UNCLOS.  
 
Beside that the military value of these islands are equally difficult to quantify and 
estimate.  The potential of China and other claimants using the islands as a staging area 
for its naval activities and intelligence gathering cannot be ruled out.  Many nations used 
the strategy of forward defense in shaping their defense strategy. The proximity of the 
Spratlys to the South China Sea SLOC adds an important strategic element to the dispute. 
Therefore I can safely conclude that the Spratly region does have strategic values and can 
serve as an igniter of conflict. 
                                                 
121 Ibid Lee Lai To. (1999, p 14), Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), April 10, 1988. 
122 Malaysia Foreign Minister Speech delivered  September 2, 1999 at University Malaya Campus in Sabah  
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N.   CONCLUSION 
 
Competing claims Spratly Islands started in the 1970s when nations justified their 
claims utilizing historical evidences, discovery, effective occupations and established 
laws and regulations stipulated in the 1982 UNCLOS and international laws.  Clashes 
broke out between Vietnam and China and the Philippines and China. Exchanges of harsh 
diplomatic notes between Malaysia and the Philippines and between China and Malaysia 
have also occurred as a result of these disputes.  What are the main reasons for all these 
claims? Is it because of its economic potential, oil, gas or strategic value, or the control of 
the SLOC?  These are the fundamental questions that need to be asked and answered.    
 
Examining the legal aspects of the claims, no claimant nations have presented 
sufficiently strong or unchallengeable evidence in arguing their claims.  Each has their 
own flaws and most of all each and every nation opposes each other’s claim thus 
weakens the claim and making the situation even more complex and difficult.  Taiwan, 
Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia may possess some strength in their argument 
pertaining to effective occupation.  In my opinion, the underlying reason why nations 
claim these islands is because of the economic value that comes with the ownership of 
these islands. The 1982 UNCLOS allows nations to claim an exclusive economic zone of 
200 nm where a nation has the rights to exploit the resource. Despite contradicting 
assessments and findings of untapped resources the region harbor, the potentials the 
regions possess cannot be ruled out.   
 
The adjacent exploration activities by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei 
and Malaysia are a clear indication that these potentials could be present for it may share 
the same continental shelf trough.  With the demand of energy needs growing, countries 
continue to explore and drill for these resources further out to the sea to meet these 
demanding needs to fuel it fast growing economies.    Oil and gas exploration, especially 
when major finds or progresses to active exploitation, is the most likely catalyst for 
conflict today. It is important to note that even if no major oil deposits are confirmed, the 
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mere act of exploration could trigger conflict since such activity could be viewed as a 
direct challenge to another claimant’s sovereignty. 
 
More than half of the world's annual maritime trade that passes through the Straits 
of Malacca and continues on through the SLOCs of the South China Sea.  This artery 
joining the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean is vital to the economic well being of the 
Southeast and East Asian nations.  Merely preventing its usage may trigger conflict 
among these nations. Therefore keeping the SLOC open is important. 
The claimants view the Spratly regions as a strategic location where their forward 
defense elements can be placed, for example for the gathering of intelligence activities 
and for forward bases of their naval units and aircraft to replenish in time of conflict.  
Besides that, early warning and identification of incoming threats can be further 
enhanced if sophisticated equipment is installed in these islands.  The presence of 
military personnel in the claimed areas indicates that some form of surveillance or 
monitoring is being carried out in the region.  The chances of giving up these claims are 
slim given each nation has constructed permanent infrastructures, has placed medium 
range armament and has stationed armed troops to protect and deter other claimants from 
claiming it.   
The complexity of the claims, couple with the economic potentials and strategic 
potentials these islands possess, it is difficult to find a compromise.  The recently 
concluded declaration of Conduct of Parties in Phnom Penn November 2002 is seen as a 
great step when China formally acknowledged to a multilateral approach in resolving this 
competing claims.  Chapter IV will explore the declaration of Conduct of Parties and 
ASEAN’s confidence building mechanisms and with the aim to come up with some 
viable solutions to the existing problem.   
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III.  MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POLITICAL WILL OF 
CLAIMANTS 
 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
  
Chapter II outlined the historical background of the Spratly’s claims of each of 
the countries involved. At this point, predicting the next course of actions that each 
claimant will take is an uncertainty.  However, it is safe to predict that none of the 
claimants will forego what they have claimed thus far. Malaysia’s latest claim to the 
Investigator Shoal and the Erica Reef in June 1999 and Vietnam's expansion and 
construction of structures on the Tennent Reef, the South Cornwallis Reef and the Alison 
Reef in October 1999, indicates only that the claimants will apply a strategy of “talk and 
take.”123 When opportunities arise, claimants will continue to stake their claims and 
expand their structures while, at the same time, negotiating a solution.  The harassing of 
fishermen among claimant nations against one another continues despite the signing of 
the declaration of conduct of parties in November 2002.  Claimants also continue to 
prospect for oil and gas in waters adjacent to the disputed areas. In July 2003, Malaysia 
announced its third discovery of oil off the Sabah coast, located in the vicinity of the 
disputed areas. 124 What does this scenario represent?  What actions should claimant 
nations take to keep the region calm and prevent the other from taking provocating 
actions?   
 
This chapter addresses why claimant nations are not able to collaborate and 
compromise in the Spratlys claims.  It will investigate the extend to which the claimants 
can sustain their claims with the present military capabilities.  The trends claimants tend 
to take will be examined to determine whether the leadership has the political will to 
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sustain what the nations have claimed so far.  The chapter concludes that even though 
nations may not have the necessary military assets and capabilities to maintain 
continuous surveillance or presence, the majority of the claimants are not willing to 
forego what they have claimed. Therefore they may use military force to defend their 
interests if and when the need arises. 
 
B. DIFFICULTY IN COMPROMISING 
 
The background of each country’s claims in Chapter II explains each nation uses 
various interpretations and justifications in arguing its claims.  Chapter II has also shown 
that each claim has weaknesses and strengths. Nevertheless, the claimants have not been 
willing to compromise despite various efforts to resolve the issue bilaterally and 
multilaterally over the past decade.  China and the Philippines or Vietnam and the 
Philippines have signed a bilateral code of conduct in August 1995 and November 1995 
respectively. This has not stopped China from expanding the structures built on the 
disputed Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, the Philippines from firing at or arresting Chinese 
fishing boats operating close to the disputed Scarborough Shoal, and Vietnam from firing 
shots at the Philippines Air Force reconnaissance aircraft that flew over the disputed 
Tennent Reef a few months after signing the code of conduct.  125  Why these incidents 
happened could be deduced from four assumptions. First, each nation has its own 
interests and if and when the interests are not met, no agreement is conclusive.  Many 
scholars argue that the economic and strategic value is the main interest of the claimant 
nations while others argue that the issue of sovereignty is the main interest. According to 
Shee Poon Kim, China’s occupation of the Mischief Reef was “not merely a dispute over 
sovereignty with the Philippines, but rather a manifestation of China’s larger concern for 
its political and strategic interests.”126 He further states that, “China’s growing 
assertiveness in the South China Sea is merely a return to a familiar area which has been 
perceived as its natural sphere of interest and influence.” Depending which nation one 
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examines, all these considerations are important and all the different nations have their 
own interpretations and priorities. As long as the claimant interests are not met, finding a 
compromise is difficult and is not forthcoming. 
 
Second, among the six claimant states three different political systems of 
governance exist. China and Vietnam are communist states. Taiwan, Malaysia and the 
Philippines are democratic states and Brunei is a monarchy. China, the Philippines and 
Vietnam have used force in asserting their claims and the other three claimants are using 
diplomatic means to try to defuse tensions. Why do only China, Vietnam and the 
Philippines use force and why not the others?  According to Liselotte Odgaard, China 
will continue “its tradition of using force, when its territorial rights [are] encroached 
upon.”127 And Andrew Scobell states that “China is willing to pursue its claims 
militarily.”128 He goes on to argue that China and Vietnam were “the main belligerents in 
the 1970s and 1980s.” China has ongoing border disputes with Japan, India, Russia, 
Taiwan and Vietnam. It shelled the Taiwanese island of Quemoy in 1954, 1955 and 1958. 
It went to war with India in 1962, with Russia in 1969 and with Vietnam in 1974 and 
again in 1979. Both China and Vietnam had bitter experiences in the past and they do not 
hesitate to militarily settle disputes. Therefore, using the military now is not something 
uncommon.   
 
The Philippines, being relatively weak militarily, needs to instigate a scene that 
draws the media attention in order to seek out support internally and externally, 
especially from its ASEAN neighbors and the United States. According to Daojiong Zha 
and Mark J. Valencia, “the Philippines tried to win sympathy from the regional powers 
for its case.”129 They further state that “the Philippines tried to internationalize the 
dispute through the media…and [raise] international awareness of China’s behavior.” Lee 
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FPRI’s Asia Program on “Flashpoints in East Asia” held May 12, 2000 
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 42 
Lai To states that “not only does Manila want to internationalize the issue, it would also 
like to bring the United States into the Spratly dispute.”130   
 
According to Liselotte Odgaard, Malaysia and Brunei “practice the use of non-use 
of force developed in Southeast Asia during the Cold War.”131 I would argue that 
Malaysia and Brunei would like to resolve any dispute the “ASEAN way,” that is through 
dialogue and consultation. Taiwan, on the other hand, would rather devote its effort to 
develop its economy and engage diplomatically to resolve the dispute. This will also help 
Taipei to project itself economically and gain acceptance internationally, which it badly 
requires right now. 
 
Third, the leadership styles of these nations vary greatly. According to She ldon 
W. Simon, the PRC leadership sees “China as a rising power and a natural leader in Asia 
and China is willing to pursue through force any of its territorial ambitions in the South 
China Sea.”132 According to some Chinese scholars, the current leadership will continue 
to assert its claims on the Spratlys because Beijing considers the South China Sea as part 
of China’s territory. 133 On the contrary Cheng Li argues that “greater changes seems 
inevitable … more diversified, more committed, and less dogmatic generations of leaders 
aggressively rise to power in China.”134 A belief is that both Beijing and Hanoi leaders 
would defend their claims and would not hesitate to use military force to assert their 
interests; whereas, the other nation leaders are believed to only use the military as the last 
option after diplomatic efforts failed. This is a common practice of democratic states 
seeking consensus first. Besides that, not all the nations claim the same area. China, 
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Taiwan and Vietnam claim the entire of the Spratlys and Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Brunei only claim part of it.   
 
Finally, politically China does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state and it 
claims Taiwan as one of its provinces, which Taiwan refuses to acknowledge. Taiwan 
lost its position in the UN and its legitimacy internationally when China replaced it in 
1971. Since then it has repeatedly been trying into gain entrance to the UN. Its most 
recent bid in September 2003135 was rejected. The “one-China” policy that all other 
claimant nations adopted creates problems because Taiwan cannot officially participate 
diplomatically in forums as a sovereign state relating to this claim. In March 2000, 
China’s Vice-Premier Qian Qichen, in charge of Beijing’s Taiwan policy, stated in his 
talk at a conference of directors of the Office of Taiwan Affairs that “the Chinese 
government will never compromise on the “one-China” principle.”136 Stein Tonnesson 
said that “no states [will] recognize both regimes simultaneously.”137 This has 
compounded the complexity of the dispute.  Unless all the competing claimants are able 
to participate, the dispute is not likely to be resolved and remains a potential flash point 
for conflict in the region. Despite many attempts by various countries and organizations 
to broker a solution to the conflict, no positive results have occurred. This makes 
collaboration and consensus building to resolve the disputes among the claimants 
difficult.  Can the nations sustain and secure their claims and is their political will strong 
enough?  The answer to these two questions will be investigated later in this chapter. 
 
In sum, the interests of claimant states, their differences in leadership and their 
political systems of governance, while Beijing’s  “one-China” policy has increased the 
complexity of the competing claims in the Spratlys. This diversity poses the greatest 
challenge in finding a compromise that meets each and all claimants’ interests, needs and 
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aspirations. The legal status of Taiwan has to be addressed because Taipei is one of the 
claimants. Unless Taipei and Beijing are willing to accept some form of compromise and 
collaborate with each other, the dispute in the Spratlys will remain unsolved for many 
years to come.   
  
C. MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
 
The distances of each claimant nation from the Spratlys figures into assessing 
whether they have adequate resources to provide security to the area and maintain their 
claims.  Besides distance, the capabilities of providing logistic support, protection and 
early warning will play an important role.  China and Taiwan are situated approximately 
1000 nm and 1200 nm respectively and are the furthest claimants in these disputes. 
Vietnam is approximately 250 nm away. Malaysia and Brunei are 130 nm from the area 
and the Philippines is about 100nm to its nearest coast.   
 
Eric Hyer argues that “China’s naval modernization and expansion [are] 
motivated by interests to control the South China Sea”138 and he concludes that “Beijing 
is adopting a more assertive approach to the South China Sea disputes.” Ji Gouxing states 
that “China’s naval buildup is for offshore defense of China’s maritime rights and 
interests in its maritime jurisdictional zones, which includes the Spratlys.”139  
Additionally according to Kristen Nordhaug, Taiwan does not have the capabilities to 
patrol shipping routes in the South China Sea.   
 
The Spratlys are also outside the reach of its air force.140  Allen Shephard states 
that development in regional military capabilities in Southeast Asia is partly due to an 
                                                 
138 Eric Hyer, “The South China Disputes: Implications of China’s Earlier Territorial Settlements”, Pacific 
Affairs, Vol.68 (Spring 1995), 34-54 
139 Ji Guoxing, “SLOC Security in the Asia Pacific”, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies , Occasional Paper 
Series, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 2000,  p 3-5 
140 Kristen Nordhaug.  “Explaining Taiwan’s Policies in the South China Sea.” The Pacific Review. Vol.14. No. 
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increase of “the ability to defend their maritime interests.”141 He further states that China, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines are all upgrading their naval assets to 
strengthen their capabilities in the Spratlys regions. According to Sheldon W. Simon, the 
Philippines lacks the capability to project power in the South China Sea to defend its 
claims of the Spratly Islands and it has less than five airworthy F-5s and a navy of World 
War II vintage ships. Malaysia’s purchase of FA-18s and Russian MIG-29s142 along with 
its replacement of patrol crafts to 27 offshore patrol vessels will enhance its capabilities 
and provide the security needed to maintain its claims in the Spratlys. 143 In a report 
published in the Oil and Gas Journal on October 25, 1999, China’s military upgrading, 
particularly its navy and air force, will have an impact in its claims in the Spratlys. Jane’s 
Intelligence Digest dated November 24, 2000 reported that Vietnam is upgrading its 150 
MIG 21 fighters and purchased another 12 modern SU-27 fighters for its air force. It 
further reported that Russian built Tarantul missile corvettes equipped with Zvezda SS-
N-25 surface-to-surface missiles and 2 Sang O Boats purchased from North Korea144 
were added to its naval inventory.  This will enhance Vietnam’s capability further. 
 
In sum, comparing the statistics published in Jane’s Fighting Ships 2003 (Figure 
3) and Jane’s Fighting Aircraft 2003 (Figure 4), the order of battle for the naval and air 
units of claimant states to defend their claims effectively is limited to China. China’s 
naval and air force assets and capabilities far outnumber those of the other claimants.  
With a vast inventory of available assets, China is capable of enforcing its claims even 
though these assets are old. Its current upgrading will further enhance its capability and 
dictate the security environment in the disputed areas of Spratlys.  Regardless those 
countries like Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia do not have adequate 
assets, they will continue their naval patrols and fly their maritime patrol/reconnaissance  
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Ship Type  
/Strength  
China Vietnam Taiwan Malaysia Philippines Brunei 
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Figure 3: Summary of Naval Capabilities of Claimant Nations 
Source: Compiled from data obtained Jane’s Fighting Ship 2003 available at http://www2.janes.com/  (6/14/03) 
 
 
aircraft in the disputed area, demonstrating their resilience and consistency in their effort 
to protect their claimed islands and reefs. 145  Malaysia’s recent commissioning of its first 
                                                 
145 There have been reports of the Philippines naval ships arresting Chinese fishing vessels, and this have been an 
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navy ships have been actively patrolling the areas and numerous arrest were made over the years.  Since 1999, there has 
not been any report of close encounters between naval units in the area with the exception of maritime patrol aircraft 
reported being shot at near the Vietnamese claimed islands. 
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patrol vessel on September 25, 2003, which will be operational next year, will enhance 
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Brunei is the only claimant that has not built any structure in its claimed reef, and 
it has the least assets among all the claimants. Despite their limited resources, the 
claimant countries will ensure that their continued presences are felt and that their troops 
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in the claimed islands and reefs are fully re-supplied when required.  The chances of 
these forces encountering each other at sea or in the air are highly probable. Thus the 
potential for misjudgment is always present unless a provision is made to prevent it. 
 
D. POLITICAL WILL OF CLAIMANTS 
 
The political will of claimants is important in determining whether these states are 
able to sustain their claims, and what actions they will take if their claims are threatened. 
Regarding political will, Lee Lai To states that China is following a policy of “cautious 
opportunism” and taking [a] gradualist approach, and China has been successful in 
“consolidating its control and establishing a foothold in the Spratlys.”147 He further 
states, “nationalist fervor based on history and domestic political priorities” will continue 
to enhance the political will to claim the area. According to Todd C. Kelly, Vietnam will 
continue to strengthen its military presence; it is not willing to simply surrender what is 
considered historic territory. 148  Yann-huei Song states that the Philippine government’s 
recent action of encouraging civilians to reside in the disputed island of Pag-Asa (Hope) 
and its (likely deployment of) paramilitary troops to the disputed areas reinforces its 
political will to maintain its claims. 149  Malaysia has been maintaining an effective 
occupation in its claimed islands and reefs since Malaysia first claimed the area in the 
early 1980s. Scott Snyder argues, “it is possible to find a political ‘win-win’ settlement 
for military conflict would threaten the interests of all parties in the dispute, since the 
political costs of military escalation would be higher than any single party is currently 
willing to bear.” 150 A March 17, 2003 article of Strategic Forum states that the recent 
leadership changes in China will not affect Beijing’s political will of China in handling 
the competing claim issue of the Spratly Islands.     
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In summary, the political will demonstrated so far by all claimants has not 
changed drastically even though China’s and Taiwan’s leadership has changed recently.  
Therefore all claimant states will continue to seek the current status quo and will continue 
to occupy the reefs/islands if given the opportunity, as Malaysia did in June 1999. 
However, the claimants will not act irrationally to spark any direct confrontation with the 
other claimants and do not want to be viewed as “the aggressor.” All claimants with the 
exception of Taiwan for the first time collaborated, compromised and demonstrated their 
willingness to cooperate in order to find solutions to the conflict by signing the 
Declaration of Conduct Parties in the South China Sea on November 4, 2002 in Phnom 
Penh.   Taiwan’s leadership has shown keen interest in participating in forums and other 
confidence building measures, but it has been sidelined by China.  China has clearly 
indicated that if Taiwan is invited to any of these forums, it will not participate and has 
reiterated many times that Taiwan should resolve its competing claim bilaterally with 




Competing claims in the Spratly Islands started in the 1970s, with each nation 
justifying its claims utilizing historical evidences, discovery, effective occupation and 
established laws and regulations stipulated in the 1982 UNCLOS and international laws.  
Clashes between Vietnam and China and between the Philippines and China, near clashes 
between Vietnam and the Philippines, and harsh exchanges of diplomatic notes between 
Malaysia and the Philippines and between China and Malaysia have occurred over the 
past two decades as a result of this dispute.  
 
Fundamental questions that address these incidents need to be asked; nonetheless, 
solutions to these questions may not be forthcoming due to the complexity of the 
disputes. This chapter has examined why the claimants are not able to compromise and 
collaborate. The complexity of the claims are further compounded by China not 
recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state and not allowing Taiwan to take part in any 
organized official forums to resolve this conflict.  This Chapter also examined all the 
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claimants’ military capabilities and the political will of the competing nations pertaining 
to the Spratlys cla ims.  
 
The interests of each claimant are different and each has its own priorities in 
setting their own agendas in this competing claims.  As long as their interests are not 
served, it is difficult to find a compromise in resolving the dispute.  If all the claimants 
claimed all of the Spratlys, it might be possibly easier to propose a solution to the 
conflict.  However, only three of the six do so.  Unless some unforeseen circumstance 
occurs, I believe that this dispute will remain status quo if the claimants agree not to take 
further actions to add features or structures to the existing claimed areas or to claim any 
new reefs.  All claimants must not adopt “talk and take” strategies and adhere to the 
declaration that has been agreed upon in Phnom Penn in November 2002. 
 
What are the chances of Taiwan backing down and agreeing to China’s “one-
China” policy or willing to compromise and allowing China to represent Taiwan in 
handling these competing claims with the other claimants?  Since becoming president, 
Chen Shui-bian has steered a course of ambiguity to avoid military confrontation with 
China while, at the same time, not abandoning Taiwan’s independence as an option. Chen 
Shui-bian has difficulty compromising and taking a back seat. Moreover, if he were to do 
so, it may affect his reelection in 2004.  People believe that eventually Taiwan will be 
able to accept the “one-China” policy. However, Taiwan’s legal status has to be resolved 
with China so that a multilateral arrangement or agreement can be brokered among all the 
six claimants. Without Taiwan’s active participation, any solution to this dispute will be 
incomplete. Additionally, it is unlikely in the near future, ASEAN states will negotiate 
with Taiwan in order not to offend China. In these circumstances, not much can be done 
by Taiwan to press ASEAN to change course. What is the next best option?  
 
Militarily China, with its vast numbers of arsenal in its naval and air inventory 
can provide security and assert its presence in the disputed areas.  Even though the other 
claimants do not have adequate assets to assert a continuous presence in the disputed 
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areas, they will continue to station troops in the claimed areas to ensure effective 
occupation of what they have claimed. They will also continue to patrol their claimed 
areas with naval ships and maritime patrol/reconnaissance aircraft to provide assurance to 
their troops in the claimed areas while ensuring continuous logistic support to them as 
well. Provided restraints or contingencies have been agreed upon among the claimant 
nations, the chances of these military units initiating a flare-up in the disputed areas and 
destabilizing the security environment in the South China Sea are low.   
 
The likelihood that Vietnam, China and the Philippines may resort to force again 
should not be ruled out.  Clashes among the other ASEAN claimants are not likely 
because a mechanism is available in ASEAN to resolve issues among them.  Taiwan will 
continue to maintain Itu Aba Island, which its troops occupy despite not being able to 
participate diplomatically in forums among the claimants. The potential for skirmishes 
over this dispute is heightened when the nations’ interests are challenged and at stake. 
 
The recently concluded Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 
which provides avenues for consultation and dialogue, will be examined in the next 
chapter to determine whether positive outcomes are viable.  As long as claimant nations 
are willing to agree to disagree, the chance of conflict is reduced. Regional peace and 
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IV.  CONDUCT OF PARTIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is a product of 
years of negotiations among the parties involved in the competing claims in the South 
China Sea. For this purpose ASEAN concluded an agreement with China on a 
nonbinding declaration that is intended to prevent military confrontations over the 
disputed areas of Spratly Islands. The initial idea was to formulate a code of conduct. 
Because of an inability to arrive at a consensus on various issues, a lesser declaration was 
signed instead with the aim of concluding a code of conduct in the future.  
The idea of a code of conduct was mooted in the early 1990s as a result of a series 
of incidences between the claimants and of China enacting its Law on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone on February 25, 1992, which includes the Spratlys and other 
islands as part of the Chinese territory. 151  The first military confrontation over these 
competing claims occurred between Vietnam and China in 1974 over the Paracels 
Islands, and again in March 1988, over the Spratly Islands. Subsequently there were 
clashes between the Philippines and China in 1995 over the Mischief Reef. In addition, 
several near clashes occurred, between Malaysia and the Philippines, between the 
Philippines and Vietnam, and between the Philippines and China in the 1995.  The latest 
reported incident occurred in mid-2002, when Vietnamese troops fired at a Philippines air 
force reconnaissance aircraft when it flew over the disputed islands. 
All the signatories to the declaration agreed to exercise self-restraint in 
conducting activities that could trigger off skirmishes, such as building structures, 
inhabiting in the disputed islands, and conducting seismic research in the disputed areas. 
They also agreed, to notify the other claimants in advance of any military exercises in the 
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disputed region. This accord aims to set the framework for future talks among the 
claimant nations. However, it does not specify certain required details required that 
negotiators had earlier intended because some of the Spratlys claimants had objections.  
Taipei, which is a claimant in this conflict, is not a signatory to the declaration 
leaving it no avenue to participate in resolving this dispute.  China objects to Taiwan’s 
official participation in all discussions concerning these claims and wants Taiwan to 
resolve this issue with Beijing bilaterally.  With the absence of Taiwan, can this 
declaration be effective? Can it be utilized to resolve or lessen the tensions in the region?   
This chapter starts with the definitions of “code”, “conduct” and “declaration.” 
and the definition of “multilateralism” is also defined with the aim of analyzing whether 
the regional institutions conform to the definition. The genesis of the code is discussed, 
and its principles are examined. The advantages of signing the declaration are evaluated 
as to whether nations will be able to utilize the declaration to prevent further incidents 
from occurring.  The Track I and II confidences-building mechanisms that are currently 
available are examined to determine whether they enhance stability in the region. This 
chapter also discusses the roles played by the United States and Japan. It concludes that 
the dispute cannot be resolved multilaterally without Taiwan’s participation and it argues 
that Taiwan’s involvement may reduce the potential for conflict in the region. 
B. GENESIS OF THE DECLARATION OF CONDUCT OF PARTIES IN THE
 SOUTH CHINA SEA 
 Dictionary.com defines “code” as a “systematic collection of regulations and rules 
of procedure or conduct: a traffic code.” And it defines “conduct” as to “direct the course 
of; manage or control.” “Declaration” is defines as “an explicit, formal announcement, 
either oral or written.” 152 Examining these definitions, a code is a binding set of rules 
that the contracting parties are required to adhe re to when managing the contracting 
parties claims. Furthermore, the declaration of conduct of parties means, it is a formal 
written announcement that only manages or controls the disputes and does not bind the 
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contracting parties together.  It additionally states that the contracting parties are not 
necessarily legally bound by the declaration.  
The objective of having a code of conduct is to lay the foundation for cooperation 
and peaceful settlement of disputes. By applying the confidence-building measures, 
ASEAN envisaged that the Spratlys will not become a flash point for conflict. A step-by-
step approach was taken in the process of formulating the code of conduct, obtaining 
consensus, and agreeing to the terms and principles stipulated in the code. The origin of 
this declaration goes back to the Declaration of the South China Sea issued by the foreign 
ministers of the ASEAN on July 22, 1992. (hereafter called the Manila Declaration).153 
The Manila Declaration emphasized the “necessit[y] to resolve all sovereignty and 
jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort 
to force.”154  The declaration contended that all parties are to apply the principles 
contained in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)155 as 
the basis for establishing a regional code of conduct for South China Sea.  As a result 
ASEAN tasked Manila and Hanoi to formulate a code based on their experiences with the 
codes of conduct that they had concluded between China and themselves.  Two codes of 
conduct -- the August 1995 Joint Statement Republic of the Philippines-PRC 
Consultations on the South China Sea and Other Areas of Cooperation, and the 
November 1995 Joint Statement on the Fourth Annual bilateral Consultations between 
the Philippines and Vietnam -- formed the basis for the code.156 
The drafting processes of the South China Sea code of conduct was discussed and 
endorsed both in “Track I” mechanisms, (such as ASEAN summits, ASEAN ministerial 
meetings (AMM) and the ASEAN Regiona l Forum (ARF)) and “Track II” meetings, 
which includes the Indonesian-sponsored informal Workshop on Managing Potential 
                                                 
153 See Appendix 1 for the detail of the 1992 Declarations 
154 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, “A Code of Conduct for Human and Regional Security Around the South China 
Sea,” Ocean Development & International Law Journal, No. 32, 2001 p 133 
155 See Appendix 2 for the details of the 1976 TAC 
156 Nguyen Hong Thao, “Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea,” Ocean Development & 
International Law Journal, No. 32, 2001 p 113 
 56 
Conflicts in the South China Sea (hereafter called the Workshop) and the Council for the 
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).157  
In August 1999, Manila presented a draft code on behalf of ASEAN, and China 
drafted its own version of the code in October 1999. During the informal summit between 
China and ASEAN held in Manila on November 28, 1999, China rejected the code 
drafted by the Philippines, but agreed to hold further discussions on it. During the Tenth 
Workshop in Bogor, Indonesia on December 5-8, 1999, participants “expressed support 
for further effort to develop a code of conduct and agreed to continue exchanging views 
in the Workshop.”158    
Two major revisions were made to the version drafted by the Philippines in 
August 1999. First, the definitions of the disputed areas were adjusted to include 
specifically the Spratlys and the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. This revision 
was mainly to accommodate Hanoi because of its disputes with China in the Paracels.159 
The second revision deleted exploration and exploitation of resources, which has been a 
sensitive issue between and/or among the claimants, particularly the Philippines and 
Vietnam. These two claimants were reluctant to enter into any joint development projects 
in the disputed areas prior to settling these competing disputes.160  
The ASEAN–China Informal Consultation on the South China Sea Code of 
Conduct was held in Cha-Am, Thailand on March 14-15, 2000. China presented its 
October 1999 draft for discussion in this forum. Both drafts contained several common 
principles.  According to Liselotte Odgaard and Yann-huei Song, both drafts expressed 
support for the peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to military actions or 
using of force.  The other aspect included exercising self- restraint in the conduct of 
activities in the disputed areas in order not to further complicate or magnify the 
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dispute.161  Both ASEAN and China agreed to study the possibility of undertaking joint 
projects in the areas, such as marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, 
safety of navigation and communication, search and rescue cooperation, and the fight 
against transnational crimes.162  They also agreed to use universally recognized 
principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS, as the foundation governing 
their relationships. 
However, five major differences also exist. First, China insisted that the code 
should apply to the Spratly group of islands only; whereas, ASEAN wanted the code to 
be observed in and applied to both Spratly and Paracel groups of islands.163  China 
asserted that disputes relating to the Paracels should be resolved between China and 
Vietnam bilaterally, but ASEAN preferred a combination of bilateral and multilateral 
consultations on both groups of disputed islands.  Second, ASEAN’s draft included 
injunctions against erecting structures on presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, 
cays and other features in the disputed areas; the Chinese version did not mention these.  
Third, the Chinese version requested the parties concerned to refrain from use or threat of 
force or coercive measures, including seizure, detention or arrest of fishing vessels or 
other civilian vessels in the disputed areas.  The ASEAN version only proposed to ensure 
just and humane treatment of other nationals. Fourth, the ASEAN version asked the 
parties concerned to inform voluntarily other parties concerned of significant policies and 
measures that affect the disputed area; the Chinese version does not mention this issue.  
Fifth, the Chinese version asked all parties concerned to refrain from conducting any 
military exercises directed against any parties concerned in the Spratlys and the adjacent 
waters and from conducting close- in military reconnaissance. In addition, the Chinese 
wanted all military patrol activities to be restricted in the disputed areas.  The ASEAN 
version did not mention this.   
                                                 
161 Ibid 
162 Ibid Liselotte Odgaard (2002 p 242-243) 
163 “Keeping the Waters calm in South China Sea,” The Straits Times , November 21, 2002, Ibid Nguyen Hong, 
2001 p 115 
 58 
Subsequent ASEAN-China formal consultations on the South China Sea code of 
conduct were held in Malaysia on May 26, 2000, on August 24-25, 2000 in China, on 
October 11, 2000 in Vietnam, 164 and in Brunei in July 2002 to finalize the major 
differences in both the proposed draft codes. No apparent clear consensus was met after 
three years of unresolved discussions and disagreements.  With Malaysia’s intervention 
pushing for an interim measures so as not to prolong the issue longer, on November 4, 
2002, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea formally signed between ASEAN and China, rather than a stronger code of 
conduct that ASEAN originally wanted. No geographical area is mentioned in the agreed 
declaration, which allows some ambiguity for Hanoi to interpret the inclusion of Paracels.  
Furthermore no commitment exist in the declaration stating that parties will not built new 
structures on islets and reefs as ASEAN wanted.  Nevertheless, it calls on states to 
“refrain from action of inhabiting presently uninhabited islands, reefs,” etc specifically 
some provides some sort of promise towards this goal. 165  Efforts by China to limit 
military exercises and other activities in the disputed areas of the Spratlys failed, but 
ASEAN agreed to a provision on voluntary notification of any “joint/combined” military 
exercises in the South China Sea.166 
Even though this declaration is non-binding, it is a small step towards consensus 
building and compromise, by which the majority of the claimants agreed to work together 
multilaterally. This first step is important because it indicates that the parties to the 
declaration desire to prevent accidental incidents from happening. China went a step 
further and agreed to consider acceding to the ASEAN’s 1976 Treaty to Amity and 
Cooperation. Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing pledged to seek his country’s 
legislative approval to sign the treaty formally at the October 2003 ASEAN-China 
summit meeting.167  On October 9, 2003, China signed the Treaty to Amity and 
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Cooperation in Bali, Indonesia.168 With the signing of this treaty, some scholars argue 
that China will be legally bound by it, making the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea legally binding. Nonetheless, it is still too early to predict how 
China will act with this signing.  
C. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION 
 
 
When comparing the principles in Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea to those of the 1976 TAC, the 1992 Manila Declaration, and the 1997 Joint 
Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member States of 
ASEAN and the President of the People’s Republic of China, several similarities are 
apparent. These can be summarized as follows: 
All parties 
n reaffirmed their respect and commitment to the freedom of navigation in 
and through the South China Sea. 
n agreed to resolve their territorial disputes by peaceful means without resort 
to the use of force. 
n pledged to exercise self-restraint in activities that could spark disputes, 
such as inhabiting still uninhabited features. 
n agreed to enhance their efforts to build trust among them. 
n agreed to exchange views among defense officials and to give advance 
notice of military exercises on a voluntary basis.  
n agreed to provide humane treatment to any person in danger or distress. 
n Agreed to cooperate in marine environmental protection and scientific 
research, safety of navigation, search and rescue operations and in the 
fight against transnational crime.  
  
                                                 
 





Besides these principles, the claimants also pledge mutual respect for the 
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identities of all 
states and non- interference in the affairs of another.  In signing the declaration and the 
other principles agreed during the signing of these three treaties, the claimants have 
entered into a form of multilateral agreement.  These are positive strengths that claimants 
should capitalize on and work from to resolve or at least manage their differences in 
order to maintain a secure and safe environment in the Spratlys region. This multilateral 
agreement has one major flaw, that is, Taiwan is also a claimant but is not a signatory.  
This flaw aside, if all the claimants strictly adhere to these principles, the opinion is that 
the severity of the competing cla ims dispute in the Spratlys can be managed.  
 
D. THE ADVANTAGES OF SIGNING THE DECLARATION 
Many scholars believed that the potential for conflict in the Spratlys has greatly 
receded with the signing of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties, especially after China 
signed the TAC. Former ASEAN’s Secretary General Rodolfo Severino argues that the 
declaration “conveys a sense of stability in the region.”169 Amitav Acharya believes that 
“the South China Sea disputes have receded to the background amidst other pressing 
challenges to regional order.”170 He goes on to argue “the declaration also reflects the 
fact that China sees a military confrontation over the Spratlys as being detrimental to its 
interests.” Yann-huei Song describes the signing of the declaration as “a major leap for 
peace.”171  Lyall Breckon, a senior analyst in CNA Center for Strategic Studies argues, 
“depending on how [the conduct] carried out, it could reduce the chance of territorial 
disputes in the Spratly Islands….”172 I argue that the advantages of the signing of this 
declaration are positive, committing those claimants who have signed to resolve or at 
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least de-escalate the dispute to a manageable level.  This small step may one day 
culminate in formation of a multilateral regime in the South China Sea to investigate the 
entire dispute in the South China Sea region. The complexities of the Spratlys disputes 
require a multilateral approach because there are six claimants involved in these 
competing claims. China’s signing of the TAC is seen as a softening of Beijing’s stance 
and it may open the potential for Taiwan to participate in resolving the Spratlys disputes.  
Depending on Taiwan’s actions and ASEAN’s effort to engage China, the outcome of 
these engagements possibly baring fruits is difficult to predict. 
E. MULTILATERALISM IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 
The reasons why these competing claims require a multilateral approach is 
because only a few areas in the Spratlys involve two competing parties, and as in some of 
the claims, more than three parties are involved.  Therefore, a multilateral approach is 
appropriate. What is multilateralism? Multilateralism refers to coordinating relations 
among three or more states in accordance with certain norms and principles.173  These 
concepts rest on the normative princ iple that peace is indivisible, and member states 
under this institution are obliged to respond collectively in the face of actual or threat of 
aggression when applied to a certain security arrangement or a collective security system, 
such as ASEAN and ARF. Response to threats could be by diplomatic means, through 
economic sanctions or by collective use of force when necessary.  This collective 
response would deter a potential aggressor and the prospect of military action would 
decline.174  
  
 The term multilateral can refer to an organizing principle, an organization, or 
simply an activity. Any of these can be considered multilateral if it involves cooperation 
among many states. The term does not analytically presuppose a certain number of states, 
but it could refer a minimum of three to a maximum of unrestricted figures. Multilateral 
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refers to an area, rather than a specific point, on a continuum. This means it can be 
analyzed in terms of degrees or gradations. 175 
 Significantly, multilateralism presupposes cooperation. Although not all 
cooperation is multilateral, all multilateral activities include cooperation.  From an 
instrumental perspective, multilateralism is a means to an end, where cooperation is a 
process by which states actively adjust their policies to take into account the interests of 
others. Multilateral activities may also be an end, or consumption good, wherein states 
prefer to do things multilaterally. 176  
  
 As an organizational form, multilateralism can be a demanding institution. 
Participating actors are expected to renounce temporary advantages and the temptations 
to define their national interest.  It also requires them to forgo ad hoc coalitions and to 
avoid policies that are based on short-term interests and situational exigencies.177 
  
 Having laid out the principle of multilateralism, it is clear that multilateralism is a 
form of cooperation among three or more states coming together based on accepted 
norms and principles of behavior and actions across a vast number of issues.  The 
instruments for executing multilateral responses to various issues vary from diplomacy, 
sanctions or use of force. In the case of ASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forum, they fit 
the definition of a multilateral institution because the members are expected to abide by 
the rules and regulations that have been agreed upon during the formation of these 
institutions. For example, ASEAN has always advocated a non-violent approach in 
resolving conflict among it members. What confidence-building mechanisms are 
available to resolve these competing claims? 
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F. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES MECHANISMS 
Two multilateral confidence-building mechanisms -- Track I and Track II are 
available avenues through which the claimants may interact and exchange views on 
issues that are laid out in the declaration. The Track I official channels are ASEAN 
summits, a ASEAN ministerial meeting (AMM) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 
Track II meetings include the Indonesian-sponsored informal Workshop on Managing 
Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea and the Council for the Security Cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).178  
1. Track I Forum 
On August 8, 1967, ASEAN was established with the signing of the ASEAN 
Declaration (hereafter the Bangkok Declaration) by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and 
Cambodia which joined ASEAN later. As part of its organization, ASEAN has 10 
dialogue partners -- Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, 
New Zealand, South Korea and the United States. Additionally ASEAN’s organizational 
structure of consists of the ASEAN summit meeting (the highest authority of ASEAN 
bringing together the heads of government of the member countries), ministerial meeting, 
the Standing Committee, Secretariat, various committees and senior officials' meeting.   
ASEAN aims to achieve three main objectives: to promote the economic, social 
and cultural development of the region through cooperative programs; to safeguard the 
political and economic stability of the region against big power rivalry; and to serve as a 
forum for the resolution of intra-regional differences.179  
The other Track I forum is the ARF that was established in 1994.  It consists of 
the 10 ASEAN member states, the 10 ASEAN dialogue partners, one ASEAN observer 
(Papua New Guinea), as well as North Korea and Mongolia. The ARF complements the 
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various bilateral alliances and dialogues, which underpin the region's security 
architecture. The formation of ARF is drawn from the ASEAN experience that a process 
of dialogue can produce qualitative improvements in political relationships. It provides a 
setting in which members can discuss current regional security issues and develop 
cooperative measures to enhance peace and security in the region. 180  
The 1995 ARF Concept Paper set out a three-stage, evolutionary approach to 
develop the ARF, moving from confidence building to preventive diplomacy, and, in the 
long term, towards a conflict resolution capability. In its first ten years, the ARF has 
made modest gains in building a sense of strategic community, and, more recently, it has 
contributed to the region's counter-terrorism work.181 However, efforts to develop tools 
of preventive diplomacy and conflict management are still at an early stage. While the 
ARF continues to focus on confidence-building measures, ARF members have also 
agreed that preventive diplomacy should proceed in tandem with these efforts, 
particularly in areas of overlap between confidence building and preventive 
diplomacy.182  
Progress toward effective solutions and confidence building via these official 
channels has been slow. The ASEAN summits, ASEAN ministerial meetings and ARF 
are all multilateral institutions that pledge to abide by international laws and the 1982 
UNCLOS. All claimants -- China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam -- are 
members in these forums except for Taiwan.  Technically, Taiwan is not bound by the 
guiding principles of these institutions while being free to act unilaterally.  The question 
is what effect could one claimant not legally bound have in the competing dispute? A 
third party could play a role in this dispute.  Using the United States to persuade and 
pressure Taiwan not to take unilateral action may work in the short term.  However in a 
long-term solution that would engage Taiwan effectively, ASEAN should persuade China 
to allow Taiwan to become an observer in the Track I forums instead of as an active 
                                                 
180 “Background to ASEAN Regional Forum” Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Site available at 




participant. In this manner, Taiwan would be in concert with the ongoing effo rts and 
discussions regarding the issue at hand. This would allow both Taiwan and China to 
interact with one other in the hope that both parties may take this as a reconciliation 
process and come to an agreement to resolve their differences over a period of time. John 
Paul Lederach suggests that a reconciliation process can take place when two parties are 
given the opportunities to interact and “points of encounter where concerns about both 
the past and future can meet.”183   
Many scholars believe that the South China Sea disputes cannot be resolved if 
Taiwan is not allowed to participate in the Track I forums. Benito Lim states that a 
“multilateral settlement involving Taiwan is doomed to fail from the very start. Yet 
without Taiwan’s participation, the multilateral scheme becomes meaningless.”184 Yann-
huei Song argues that the exclusion of Taiwan from the process is inconsistent with the 
letter and spirit of the 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea.185  He further 
states that Taiwan participation will benefit and enhance the regional efforts in 
confidence building.  
2. Track II Forum 
 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) under the Pacific Forum 
Program joined nine other institutes in July 1993 in Kuala Lumpur to establish CSCAP as 
a Track II multilateral security dialogue.186 The founding members were Australia, 
Canada, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the 
United States.  Several new members include China, Mongolia, New Zealand, North 
Korea, Russia, Vietnam, and the European Union with India as an associate member. 
Besides these members and individual, associate members from Taiwan have been 
invited to participate in this forum since December 1996. For its part, CSCAP brings 
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together military and  civilian officials and academics for informal policy discussion and 
research; participants attend in their private capacities.187 This multilateral forum seeks 
regional security and stability through dialogue, consultations, and cooperation on 
concrete issues and problems of mutual concern. 188   Furthermore, CSCAP’s Steering 
Committee oversees the work of various working groups and helps to channel CSCAP’s 
deliberations into other regional fora, such as ARF.  The main substantive work of 
CSCAP occurs through international working groups (IWGs) that delve into specific 
issues and problems.   
These working groups are notable for serving as region-wide multilateral fora for 
consensus building and problem solving, and often they address issues that are too 
sensitive for official dialogue.189 Regionally CSCAP has played important roles in 
fostering dialogue on confidence building measures through its co-sponsorship of its 
IWG.  The IWG has conducted dialogue and research on military transparency, including 
the feasibility of developing an Asian Arm registry and a generic defense white paper.190  
It has also produced views for formulating policy recommendations for regional 
government and multilateral organizations.  The Maritime Working Group has produced 
a guide entitled “Guidelines for Regional Maritime Co-operations,” which has been 
reviewed by ARF during one of its Inter-Seasonal Support Groups. As a result, a 
definitive guide on “Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security” is 
being produced and is seriously examining future broad-based regional security 
architectures and the interaction of security and economic issues in the Asia-Pacific.191  
A considerable amount of interaction has occurred between the ARF Track I forum and 
the CSCAP Track II forum.  At the official Track I level, the ARF ministers first 
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identified preventive diplomacy as a potential future role of ARF and then called for an 
independent Track II assessment as to how to bring this about.192  
The other Track II mechanism, the Informal Workshop on Managing Potential 
Conflicts in the South China Sea, is the brainchild of Ambassador Hasjim Djalal of 
Indonesia.  The first exploratory workshop was held in Bali in 1990, in which only 
ASEAN members attended.  In this workshop a second workshop was recommended that 
set the foundations for future workshops.  
The University of British Columbia (UBC) is the executing agency for the 
project. As an agent, UBC provides project administration and research services and 
contacts with participating governments, the government of Canada, other governments, 
international organizations, and regional organizations. The Centre for Southeast Asian 
Studies in Jakarta, Indonesia is the counterpart to UBC. Its participation includes local 
administration and liaison of regional governments, other governments, international 
agencies, and regional organizations. The Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) funded the project. 
The aim of the Workshop is to establish cooperation on wide initiatives in 
building confidence to undertake multilateral cooperation in the South China Sea region. 
The main objectives of the Workshop are 
n to promote and develop confidence building measure and processes in 
which the countries in the region could solve their problems through 
dialogue and mutual understanding in the interest of the region as a whole, 
n to encourage the parties to any dispute to seek ways and means to settle 
their disputes by peaceful means, and 
n to develop specific cooperative efforts or projects on which all participants 
could cooperate or learn how to cooperate.193 
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The workshop is conducted on an informal basis. The United States, Japan, 
Australia and regional authorities such as the European Union and the Office of Secretary 
General of the United Nations support this Workshop. All the participants who attend the 
Workshop act in their private capacities and are drawn from the ranks of government 
(mainly departments of foreign affairs, the diplomatic corps, and the military), academia, 
and research organizations.194 This informality has both advantages and disadvantages. 
Although issues can be discussed frankly and solutions debated freely, the concerned 
countries do not have to react to the workshop recommendations and can even implement 
policy that contradicts the workshop’s recommendations.195  
A total of twelve workshops have been conducted thus far and its participants 
have increased from the ASEAN members to include Taiwan, Canada, Australia, Japan, 
South Korea, Norway and the United Kingdom.  Classifying or characterizing the project 
is not always easy since it functions on a number of levels simultaneously. Basically, this 
is a resource/environmental track-two diplomacy initiative promoting cooperation in 
ecosystem management and cooperative security in the South China Sea. This is 
approached through the identification of areas for potential cooperation between the 
states of the South China Sea region in marine scientific research, marine environmental 
protection, navigational safety and sea communications, fisheries assessment and 
management, non- living resource assessment and development, defense and security 
issues, territorial and jurisdictional issues (other than claims to ocean-space and islands) 
and institutional mechanisms for cooperation.  
Despite their informal and nongovernmental status, each Workshop has resulted 
in statements for public release.  One key product of the workshop was the July 1991 
Bandung Statement, which advises against the use of force to settle territorial and 
jurisdictional disputes. Where possible, states should consider the possibility of 
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cooperating for mutual benefit.  Self-restraint should be exercised to avoid complicating 
the situation of the competing claims.196  In addition participants in the workshops were 
given opportunities to exchange views on their respective national positions regarding the 
territorial claims in the South China Sea.  Because of the sensitivity of the issue, some 
participants believed that this should not be discussed in informal forum and should be 
left to the countries concerned to discuss this.  In view of this, the presentation of views 
concerning the Spratlys and other territorial disputes practically ended at the Fifth 
Workshop in Bukittinggi. 
The workshops, however, did discuss several confidence-building measures in 
more detail.  Confidence-building measures should promote a cooperative atmosphere for 
preventing conflict in the South China Sea and, at the same time, should resolve 
misunderstandings that still exist among participants.  These workshops also sought ways 
to continue dialogue between and among participants so as to form the basis for 
formulating an agreement or mutual understanding on a multilateral level at a later stage.  
The Track II forums are the only forums where all the Spratlys’ claimants had the 
opportunities to interact with each other and where scholars and officials from Taiwan 
are actively involved.   These forums have given the opportunity for both China and 
Taiwan to interact unofficially.  In January 1994, China and Taiwan announced a 
concrete proposal on how to cooperate in a joint scientific expedition to survey the waters 
of the disputed Spratlys region. 197  Subsequent collaborative projects were announced 
and proposed. In particular, the meteorological units of both sides agreed to conduct 
meteorological experiments in the South China Sea from 1995-1998. Additionally 
Bejing’s China National Offshore Oil Corporation and Taiwan’s state run Overseas 
Petroleum and Investment Corporation reached preliminary agreement for joint 
exploration off the Pearl River Delta near the Pratas in the northern end of the South 
China Sea.198 However, the joint exploration was put on hold after Lee Teng-hui’s visit 
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in June 1995 visit to the United States and Beijing’s conduct of military exercises and 
missile tests in the Taiwan Straits in early 1996. Both countries have since resumed talks 
on this, but progress has been slow.   Whether these unofficial talks may lead to official 
talks between these two claimants is a difficult question to answer.  
G.  INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
Two international actors -- the United States and Japan have significant interest in 
the competing claims of the Spratly Islands, even though they are not directly link in the 
Spratlys quagmire. Any form of flare-up that occurs in these areas invariably will draw at 
least the United States and Japan into the conflict.  The sea- lanes are important to both 
Washington and Tokyo because their naval ships and merchant shipping transit these sea-
lanes to gain access to the Indian Ocean from the Pacific Ocean.  
1. The U.S. Roles 
 
The United States is the only remaining superpower that has a formidable naval 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Washington views on the Spratlys disputes will have 
tremendous impact in resolving this dispute.  Washington’s Spratlys policy of 
nonintervention takes no position as to the legal merits of competing claims of 
sovereignty since the Clinton’s administration. Scott Snyder notes that in a May 10, 1995 
statement by the U.S. Department of State on the Spratly Islands and the South China 
Sea, the immediate U.S. interests in the South China Sea disputes included “maintaining 
peace and stability in the South China Sea, maintaining freedom of navigation, and 
upholding international law, including the UNCLOS 1982.199  While maintaining its 
neutral position on the legal merits of the various territorial claims, the United States 
expressed concern over destabilizing unilateral actions in the region, declared that 
maintaining freedom of navigation is in the fundamental interest of the United States, and 
strongly urged that the disputants peacefully resolve the dispute among themselves 
consistent with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. 
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Beside the three immediate interests, Richard E. Hull argues that the United States 
has “significant economic and strategic interests in Southeast Asia and a mutual security 
treaty with the Philippines.”200 He mentions that “several U.S. oil companies hold 
concessions in disputed areas (even though they were advised of the risks beforehand by 
the U.S. Government).” According to Admiral Michael McDevitt, the United States 
needs to define its interests more broadly by “asserting that the Spratly dispute clearly has 
the potential to trigger conflict…the best course of action is to internationalize resolution 
of the dispute before resources become an issue.”201 He further argues that “it should not 
be left to fester…[and] a mechanism needs to be put in place to solve the claims.” 
Liselotte Odgaard argues “the United States maritime policy is based on the principle of 
the freedom of the high seas.”202  In another article she argues that “unless the freedom of 
navigation through the Southeast Asia waters [is hindered], the United States is not 
prepared to play an active part in the Spratlys disputes.”203    
 
With the event of September 11th, this policy may have shifted with the current 
involvement of the United States in the Philippines in pursuing the suspected terrorist that 
might have moved its operation to the Southeast Asian region.  Besides pursuing and 
eradicating terrorist networks in the region, the U. S. bilateral engagement with the 
countries in the region continues.  The annual series of exercises, the Cooperation Afloat 
and Training (CARAT),204 is seen as a commitment Washington makes to the region. 
The movement of ships from its bases in Japan and Guam to the region is a test that the 
U.S. Navy is conducting to demonstrate that the right and freedom of safe passage in the 
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sea-lanes of the South China Sea is not hampered.  In his speech on taking over 
command, Admiral Fargo, the current Pacific Command commander, reiterated, “the U.S 
will continue to show its presence in the South China Sea.” Over the last decade, the 
United States has maintained its neutrality even when the Philippines asked for its 
assistance during the Mischief Reef debacle with China.  The likelihood of the United 
States using force in this dispute is low provided its rights of safe passage through the sea 
lanes is not taken away.  The United States is supportive of all the Track I and II 
initiatives to resolve these competing claims in the Spratlys.  At all these forums 
Washington has participated actively and contributed to their successes.  The United 
States declared its endorsement of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea 
and its opposition to any claims that were not consistent with international law, including 
UNCLOS 1982.205 It has helped the claimants to generate the political will to engage in 
negotiating process of these forums. Furthermore its continued presence of the U.S in the 
region has pressured China into not taking any drastic steps in the disputes.  
 
2. Japan’s Role 
 
Japan is a strong contender for economic and political influence in the region and 
the South China Sea. The South China Sea SLOCs play an important role that serves as a 
link between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.  This economic lifeline is vital to 
Japan because most of its energy and maritime trade with Southeast Asia, South Asia, 
Africa, the Middle East and Europe passes through it. Japanese interest in the 
preservation of peace and co-operation in the South China Sea remains a major priority.  
Even though its oil tankers and merchant fleet can take a longer route via the Lombak 
Straits, this would incur additional cost and risk while taking longer time.  The ripple 
effects this may cause are tremendous.  Therefore how could Japan assist in this conflict? 
Many scholars have argued that, militarily, Japan may not be able to assist because of its 
historical past. Tokyo is restricted by Article 9 of its constitution. According to Lam 
Peng-Er, “Japan has played a significant role in the seeking to mediate in the Spratly 
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dispute… and to promote a multilateral approach to confidence building in the 
region.”206 He further stresses that Tokyo  was enthusiastic to promote a multilateral 
security forum in the region to promote “confidence building, greater military 
transparency and preventive diplomacy in the future.” The Nakayama Initiative has been 
regarded as the antecedent to the formation of the ARF. However, Marvin C. Ott states 
that “as long as the U.S-Japan Security Treaty remains viable, the Southeast Asian 
governments are confident that Japan will leave the task of protecting the vital sea lanes 
to the U.S.”207  Although Japan has been constrained by its constitution and historical 
past from direct military involvement in the competing claims, its recent proposal to 
expand cooperation between the Japanese Coast Guard and regional navies to combat 
piracy in Southeast Asian waters is indicative of this trend.208  
  
Japan is valued as an economic engine that powers much of Southeast Asia’s 
economic growth. Its key role is in the economic realm of investment, trade, loans and 
aid. Tokyo also plays an indirect strategic role by providing military bases and logistical 
support to its U.S ally maintaining a strategic presence in the disputed region.   Tokyo has 
been an active participant in both the Track I and II forums.  It has offered to finance the 
workshop organized by Indonesia provided that the workshop is conducted in Japan. 
Although the offer was turned down by Indonesia, its interest reminded others of Tokyo’s 
role in this dispute.209 
 
H. ANALYSIS 
 The Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is short for the code 
of conduct that ASEAN originally sought.  The advantage of this declaration is that it 
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acknowledges the need for the claimants to act multilaterally in order to prevent future 
skirmishes.  The principles stipulated in the declaration, if adhered to by all claimants, 
could also prevent future skirmishes. According to Yann-huei Song, “the signing of the 
declaration would help build up trust, enhance cooperation, reduce tensions and thus 
promote peace and stability in the Spratlys/South China Sea area.”210 He goes on to 
additionally argue that it is a “purely political, non- legal instrument [that] allows for 
change or abrogation in the event [of] political circumstances changes…. The 
governments when signing this non- legal instrument do intent to keep the commitment 
and to expect the other parties to do so.” Mely Caballero-Anthony states that “the 
declaration was no mean feat. It signaled a mutual desire to move forward after three 
years of futile discussion on a code of conduct.”211  Ralf Emmers argues that “claimant 
states have indicated a shared interest in promoting Southeast Asian peace and stability 
by avoiding any confrontation over the South China Sea.”212 Aileen San Pablo-Baviera 
argues that “a regional code of conduct involving all the claimants and [a] possible 
opening for accession by other interested states can play a vital role.”213  
Timo Kivimaki, Liselotte Odgaard and Stein Tonnesson argue that the principal 
failure to sign a code of conduct between ASEAN and China was due to “areas related to 
military activities.”214 They go on to state that “the code of conduct can do nothing to 
stop the consolidation of a structure of deterrence in the South China Sea. However, it 
can help to ensure that deterrence is stable by preventing the volatility.” Amitav Acharya 
argues that “the declaration [is] a confirmation of China’s gradual move towards a 
posture of dealing with ASEAN multilaterally on a subject that it had previously insisted 
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on resolving on a bilateral basis.”215 He goes on to state that, “the declaration also 
reflects that China sees a military confrontation over the Spratlys as being detrimental to 
its interest.” According to Rames Amer, he cites the Philippines and China skirmishes 
over Mischief Reefs as indicative of the fact that a ‘code of conduct’ in itself is not a 
guarantee that actions and incidents will not cause tension over disputed areas.”216 Others 
also argue that “the declaration is simply a statement of purpose that could be subject to 
differing interpretations, ignored and/or broken at anytime.”217  
I argue that the declaration is a small step taken by ASEAN and China to 
acknowledge a need to agree to disagree.  Even though it is not a legally binding 
document, it is signed on a premise of “good faith” by all the signatories.  Good faith is 
considered one of the cardinal principles that underpin international relations. Moreover, 
ASEAN and China have signed a commitment in this declaration; therefore, they are 
expected to abide by their commitments. The signing of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation by China this October is a testament of the commitment made by China. 
However, it cannot prevent any of them from breaking this commitment if they decide to 
do so.   
As highlighted by Yann-huei Song, Taiwan has been sidelined; therefore, it 
should be a participant in the formulation process and a signatory. As Lin Cheng-yi 
points out, “if Taiwan continues to improve its relationship with Southeast Asia, one can 
be sure that Taiwan will adopt a less ambiguous and more neutral stance between China 
and ASEAN claimants.”218 Other scholars view this differently and argue that Taiwan 
should deal with China separately and that they should consolidate their stand to make 
their claims more concrete in this dispute.  This is provided both China and Taiwan are 
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able to put their differences aside regarding sovereignty, which is a difficult and sensitive 
issue probably requiring a long and tedious process.  Additionally ASEAN claimants 
should unite, setting aside their interests and should approach China to allow Taiwan to 
participate as an observer initially with the hope that Taiwan can be accepted as a full 
participant in the future.  Finally, ASEAN should continue to pursue its goal of signing a 
code of conduct to replace the declaration in the future thus making the agreement a 
binding one. 
The multilateral approach of ASEAN in addressing the Spratlys issue has been 
slow.  However, it has registered success in the 1992 Manila Declaration and in China’s 
signing the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in October 2003.  Scholars have  
argued that the ASEAN mechanism has not done much in the Spratlys disputes. 
However, according to Acharya, the subtle approach using the “ASEAN Way,” which 
features “the practice of dialogue and consultations to arrive at a consensus,”219 is the 
other successes of ASEAN mechanism.  Dialogues and consultations towards consensus 
can “bring a meeting of the minds,” foster the willingness to understand diverse 
positions, cultivate patience and perseverance, constrain some states from unduly 
exercising influence or coercion over others and allow smaller states to articulate their 
position. 220 Marvin C. Ott argues that ASEAN has developed “patterns of consultation 
and collaboration; mutual trust has been nurtured and political and foreign policy elites 
have become closely acquainted with one another.”221 A Canadian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade report acknowledges that “ASEAN itself as a 
multilateral cooperation mechanism has been touted as the most successful confidence 
building process to come out of the Southeast Asian experience.”  
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The issuance of a Defense white paper by Beijing in 1995 in the effort to promote 
mutual understanding and transparency is one of the successes ARF has achieved.222 
Since its inception, ARF has been a multilateral forum and China has became 
increasingly comfortable with this forum for dialogue, exchanges of views, and other 
elements of cooperative security. This also serves as a confidence-building mechanism 
where officials from the claimant states are able to communicate and meet face to face 
with each other.   Scrutinizing ASEAN’s objectives and aims, this multilateral institution 
dedicated to enhancing peace, security and stability in the Southeast Asia region has 
come a long way.  Its effort to engage China, the largest claimant in the Spratlys disputes, 
has paid off with the signing of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.   
Presently, ASEAN is in the process of development and is still experiencing a 
“hang over” from the 1997 financial crisis and the instability crises in some of its 
member states.  Nevertheless, it remains the most successful multilateral regional 
institution after the European Union.  The ARF has established a number of Inter-
sessional Support Group (ISG) and Inter-sessional Meetings (ISM) on confidence-
building measures and search and rescue coordination cooperation. The output of these 
meetings suggests areas where cooperation can be advanced.  The meetings are 
themselves a platform where officials interact with one another. The annual ministerial 
meetings, senior officers meetings, the inter-sessional activities and other Track I 
activities are forming a web of vast networks throughout the region.  These networks, 
forming social capitals and bridging across cultures, act as an investment of human 
capital that has a vast potential to be an important investment for a crisis situation in the 
region.  That Taiwan, the sixth claimant in the Spratlys dispute, was not able to 
participate in all these forums is one of its major shortfalls. If this could be included into 
Track I agendas, it would certainly enhance confidence-building measures undertaken.   
Can these shortcomings be overcome by its participation in the Track II forums?  
The activities in the Track II forums started with limited memberships.  It was realized 
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that engagement of all the littoral states in the South China Sea was needed, including all 
the claimants in the Spratlys dispute. Given the political, economic and cultural diversity 
of the claimants and their different historical experiences, it was necessary to develop 
consensus among these diverse groups. Track II diplomacy contrasts with the traditional 
official government-to-government mode of official Track I diplomacy. It allows freer 
exchange of ideas and opinions relatively unfettered by government policy positions. 
Track II processes have close connections with Track I and interstate discussion. For 
example, work done by the Technical Working group on Legal Matters was taken up by 
government officials in the region in an attempt to formulate a regional code of 
conduct.223  The value of this initiative in laying the foundation is considered one of the 
advantages of the forums.   
Thus far, China has supported the workshop process and its efforts to promote 
cooperation on various issues that were discussed in the forums. China also 
acknowledges the need to develop confidence-building measures among the competing 
states of the Spratlys in order to foster better understanding and to keep the 
communication open. It has also shown willingness in principle to put aside territorial 
disputes in favor of joint development.   
These two forums have been in existence for over a decade and have been 
credited with bringing about greater understanding between not just the states concerned, 
but also the participating experts and officials. States allowing their senior officials to 
attend in their private capacities suggests that the initiative is being taken seriously by 
these states.  Getting the claimants involved and discussing the ongoing disputes of the 
Spratlys is an achievement in itself. It allows effective communication to take place, 
building confidence and trust in the process, and, eventually, the hope that the claimants 
can collaborate and build consensus to resolve this competing dispute. I would argue that 
the Track II forums are more successful in confidence building than the Track I forums, 
where Taiwan is excluded.  The competing claims involved six claimants; therefore, it is 
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only logical that all the claimants should be involved in the discussion for the dispute to 
be amicably resolved.  As for the United States and Japan, both have critical roles to play 
in the disputes.  The United States and Japan should continue supporting the initiative 
taken by Track I and II forums by providing experts and technical expertise in the 
working groups. The U.S Navy should continue to show its presence to counter the 
Chinese threat.   
I. CONCLUSION 
 In sum, since the beginning of 1990s, ASEAN has been actively engaging China, 
the largest and most powerful claimant in this Spratly disputes with the aim to resolve the 
Spratly disputes diplomatically since Beijing has the history of taking military action in 
territorial disputes. China’s signing of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea and its accession to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the 
Southeast Asia are positive signs indicating its willingness to approach the disputes 
multilaterally. In the case of ASEAN, it needs to consolidate its stand and persuade China 
to allow Taiwan to participate as an observer in the Track I forums by blocking its 
participation as the next course of action. At the same time it should advise Taiwan not to 
provoke or take drastic and abnormal actions that do not conform to the agreed principles 
of the declaration and the treaties that have been signed by the other claimants. If both 
Taiwan and China are able to work together informally, a common belief is that both 
parties will be able to resolve their differences in due course. Having done this, ASEAN 
should continue to pursue the code of conduct which it originally desired. Nonetheless, 
some scholars warn that the option of Beijing using its military in this dispute should not 
be ruled out, even though it has signed both the declaration and the 1976 TAC, especially 
when its national interest and sovereignty are at stake. Others view China’s softening 
stance as buying time in order to build up its military capabilities and consolidate its 
presence in the Spratlys.  
I believe that China will not resort to military action before it has exhausted its 
diplomatic efforts. What does China have to gain by using military force? The current 
 80 
leadership is more outward looking and open and it does not want to appear as a bully. 
Military actions will affect the SLOCs in the South China Sea, which in turn will draw 
the United States into the foray, which China clearly wanted to avoid.  Besides China, 
there is no guarantee that the other claimants will not take military actions unilaterally, 
especially, the Philippines and Vietnam which both have a history of using military 
means in the past.  Therefore, all the claimants should adhere to the principles of the 
Declaration and the three treaties.  If one claimant does not adhere to the agreed 
principles, the other claimants need to take some form of sanction or action in order to 
deter military action to be taken by any of the claimants.   
This declaration is hardly a year old.  Whether all claimants will adhere to the 
principles of the conduct is still too early to predict. This dispute requires a multilateral 
approach and all the claimants are required to participate in the Track I and II confidence 
building measures mechanism in order to reap positive results.  Therefore, Taiwan 
participation will definitely enhance the confidence-building process and help to prevent 
untoward incidences from occurring. 
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The security environment in the Spratly Islands has been a concern of the littoral 
states of the South China Sea. The implementation of the1982 UNCLOS, which allow 
states to claim an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles, has resulted in 
competing claims in the Spratlys region of the South China Sea. These have created 
overlapping boundaries for which states quarrel over the control of the sea and air space 
that they have claimed. Lives have been lost through skirmishes between the military 
forces and the indiscriminate shooting of innocent fishermen who have been fishing in 
these disputed areas: their traditional fishing grounds since time immemorial. China’s 
expansion in the Spratlys in the last three decades has created concern among the 
ASEAN states, so ASEAN began actively to engage China multilaterally in the early 
1990s, hoping to bind China with some form of agreement.  After three years of hard 
bargaining, collaborations and compromise, a non-binding Declaration of Conduct of 
Parties of the South China Sea has been signed between ASEAN and China on November 
2002 instead of the code of conduct that ASEAN originally desired.    
 
B. REASONS FOR CLAIMS   
 
Why claimants claim the Spratlys can be traced back to the colonial days, when 
owning territories generated spoils.  With the 1982 UNCLOS, states owning territories 
have the right to claim an EEZ and territorial waters around the claimed territories, where 
states could exploit the living and non- living resources of these areas. The Spratlys 
claimants use the 1982 UNCLOS, international laws, customary laws and other 
justifications to support their claims; nevertheless, each claim has its flaws and strengths. 
Provided the claimants are willing to resolve their claims by arbitration or agree to 
resolve through other means, this dispute will remain a potential starter for conflict in this 
region.   
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Many scholars have argued that the Spratlys region may possess economic and 
strategic potential. Oil and gas is important for all the Spratlys claimants, given that they 
have rapidly been expanding industries and economies. A reliable and cheap source of oil 
and gas is important to fuel their fast growing industries. Beside that, it is also an 
important income earner because the revenue generated can help these developing littoral 
states. Currently, oil and gas explorations are being carried out in the adjacent areas 
surrounding the Spratlys.  Even though there are no concrete reports of the presence of oil 
and gas in the region, the potentials of the disputed regions of the Spratlys having these 
precious commodities cannot be ruled out. Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam have been 
producing natural gas and oil for a considerable period of time.   
 
Besides oil and gas, the region is a rich fishing ground for the littoral states.  This 
rich protein is a vital food source to most of these states, and the fishing industry has 
provided a significant number of jobs to the population of these littoral states. It has been 
widely reported that the Spratlys region is believed to contain rich minerals, such as tin, 
manganese, copper, cobalt and nickel, in addition to phosphate, which is currently being 
produced. Some scholars argue that the importance of sea lines of communications and 
their strategic location are more important to some states.  Some even argue that the vast 
uncharted waters of the areas are more hazardous to shipping than commanding any 
potential. As long as claimants deem their claims to be their national interest, they will 
continue to claim the Spratlys. Provided all the claimants can collaborate and 
compromise multilaterally in this dispute, this region continues to be a potential flash 
point in the region. 
 
C. POLITICAL WILL 
 
The political will demonstrated by each claimant in this dispute has not changed 
even though leadership in China, Taiwan and the Philippines has changed in the last few 
years.  Militarily, China is the dominant power and its fast expanding navy is a cause for 
concern to all the other claimants in this dispute.  Its continuing efforts to rebuild stronger 
structures replacing the older structures in its claimed disputed islands indicate that it 
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seeks to maintain its continuous presence in the area.  The Philippines, being weak 
militarily, has time and again tried to internationalize the dispute in the hope that the 
United States will eventually be drawn into this dispute. Washington has repeatedly 
announced that it will not do so unless the right of safe navigation through the South 
China Sea is impeded. However, the United States Navy’s continuous presence in the 
South China Sea has contributed to the balance, which China is aware of and has 
prompted Beijing to announce its assurance that China will not take any unilateral action 
in this dispute. Malaysia’s latest construction at the Investigator Shoal and the Erica Reef 
indicates that claimants will continue to pursue their claims to strengthen their argument 
if there is arbitration in the future.  It is safe to forecast that irrespective of the military 
capabilities of these claimants, the political will of these states dictates that all claimants 
will continue to pursue their claims in the area, provided consensus occurs either to 
resolve this dispute or to allow it to remain at status quo. 
 
D. DECLARATION OF CONDUCT OF PARTIES  
 
The ASEAN – China Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
and China’s signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation are positive indications that 
the claimant states have agreed to act multilaterally and do not want the dispute to be a 
potential flash point for conflict.  The engagement of ASEAN with China has paid off, 
but some scholars argue that there was a trade-off between ASEAN and China that 
enabled this declaration to be signed. Whichever argument one makes, to be able to 
persuade China to agree to resolve this issue multilaterally is in itself an achievement 
because Beijing has always wanted to resolve territorial disputes bilaterally.  Beijing is 
softening its stance may present some hope for ASEAN to persuade China to allow 
Taiwan to participate as an observer in this multilateral arrangement.  This not only 
provides the opportunity for Taiwan to participate with the discussions on the dispute, but 
also acts as a reconciliation process for both China and Taiwan to rebuild their 
relationship in the hope that they will eventually settle their differences in the future. To 
this end, ASEAN has to be united and act as one voice.  The chances of multilaterally 
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resolving this dispute will be enhanced if Taiwan is an active participant in the Track I 
forums. 
 
The major principles of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the South China Sea and the 1992 Manila 
Declaration are as follows,  
n reaffirm mutual respect and freedom of navigation,  
n pledge resolution of disputes by peaceful means without resorting to force 
and the exercise of restraint in activities that can spark disputes,  
n enhance efforts in confidence-building measures, provide for exchanges of 
views among defense officials and advance notice of any military 
exercises, and 
n enables cooperation in areas of maritime interest.  
 
All these principles, if adhered to, will prevent an escalation of events in this dispute.  
The potential for claimants to break these principles is a question that cannot be easily 
answered.  What makes this difficult to answer is China, the Philippines, and Vietnam 
have signed codes of conduct and yet they fought each other after the signing.  Each side 
claimed that the other party was the one that started first.  The hypothesis that no clear 
orders were given to the parties on the ground may be the main course. It is difficult for a 
commander on the ground to decide when no clear guidelines have been given to them by 
their higher authorities. Whatever the reasons may be and no matter how good the 
agreement is without strict adherence and proper orders promulgated to the commanders 
on the ground, mistakes are likely to occur. Therefore, there is no guarantee that 
skirmishes will not recur.  
 
E. MULTILATERAL DISPUTES 
 
This dispute involves six claimants and is, therefore, multilateral.  Although a 
multilateral dispute might only be resolved multilaterally, a process towards a multilateral 
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resolution may often entail bilateral talks between claimants.224  Sometimes multilateral 
agreements are also preceded by bilateral treaties between some of the states concerned. 
Currently there are bilateral arrangements and treaties between the Spratlys claimants 
with the exception of Taiwan, which does not have diplomatic ties.  But economically, 
Taiwan is one of the largest investors in the ASEAN states.  It is difficult to resolve this 
dispute if Taiwan is not actively involved especially in Track I activities.  As believed, 
one of the visions of the Track II forums is to bring both China and Taiwan closer to 
forge better understanding and bridge the differences between the two states in the hope 
that they can amicably settle their differences in the near future.  
 
F. TRACK I AND II MECHANISMS AND THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN 
 
The Track I and II confidence-building mechanisms have been useful forums 
where discussions involved all the claimants.  Mechanisms for dialogue have now been 
firmly established.  A considerable number of confidence-building measures have been 
instituted or are in the progress of implementation, many of which are designed to 
enhance transparency. The Indonesian-sponsored Workshops and CSCAP forums have 
forged interactions among all the Spratlys claimants. What are the chances of these 
multilateral forums convincing China that Taiwan’s participation is vital to the security of 
the Spratlys?  These are slim but not impossible if both parties soften their stances and 
compromise, collaborate and work together to achieve a common goal.  This process may 
take time and it may not occur in the next three to five years. A more realistic outlook is 
in the next decade or so.   
 
What is the prospect that the Spratly dispute will be resolved multilaterally? It 
should not be ruled out that this cannot be done.  China’s current leadership has only 
been in power for the last ten months or so. Changes in management style have emerged, 
and Beijing portrays a more open approach in adhering to international norms. Taiwan 
has to be cautious and should act rationally in pursuing its diplomatic relations and not 
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provoking China.  Both Beijing and Taipei should continue to play an active role in the 
Track II forums and allow time for their relationship to develop so as to bridge their 
differences.  The ASEAN claimants should consolidate their positions and support this 
initiative.  The other important aspect is that all claimants must adhere to the principles of 
the declaration and the treaties that they have endorsed and signed. 
 
The Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed between 
ASEAN and China does not guarantee further disruption in the Spratlys dispute. 
However, the Track I and II confidence-building mechanisms can assist in promoting 
transparency, bridging cross culture, building networks, and building social capital so that 
the claimants can collaborate and compromise in resolving this dispute in the future.  
With strict adherence to the principles of the declaration and the treaties further clashes 
can be prevented.  Finally, ASEAN should continue to pursue the signing of the code of 
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APPENDIX A. ASEAN DECLARATION ON THE SOUTH CHINA   
SEAMANILA, PHILIPPINES, 22 JULY 1992 
 
WE, the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations;  
  
RECALLING the historic, cultural and social ties that bind our peoples as states adjacent 
to the South China Sea;  
  
WISHING to promote the spirit of kinship, friendship and harmony among our peoples 
who share similar Asian traditions and heritage;  
DESIROUS of further promoting conditions essential to greater economic cooperation 
and growth;  
RECOGNIZING that we are bound by similar ideals of mutual respect, freedom, 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the parties directly concerned;  
RECOGNIZING that South China Sea issues involve sensitive questions of sovereignty 
and jurisdiction of the parties directly concerned;  
CONSCIOUS that any adverse developments in the South China Sea directly affect peace 
and stability in the region;                       
HEREBY  
1. EMPHASIZE the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues 
pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force;  
2. URGE all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a 
positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes;  
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3. RESOLVE, without prejudicing the sovereignty and jurisdiction of countries 
having direct interests in the area, to explore the possibility of cooperation in the South 
China Sea relating to the safety of maritime navigation and communication, protection 
against pollution of the marine environment, coordination of search and rescue 
operations, efforts towards combating piracy and armed robbery as well as collaboration 
in the campaign against illicit trafficking in drugs;  
4. COMMEND all parties concerned to apply the principles contained in the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis for establishing a code of 
international conduct over the South China Sea;  
5. INVITE all parties concerned to subscribe to this Declaration of principles.  
Signed in Manila, Philippines, this 22nd day of July, nineteen hundred and ninety-two  
HRH Prince Mohamed Bolkiah 
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM  
Ali Alatas    
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA  
Datuk Abdullah Bin Haji Ahmad Badawi 
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
MALAYSIA  
Raul S. Manglapus 
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES  
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Wong Kan Seng 
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE  
Arsa Sarasin 
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
KINGDOM OF THAILAND  
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APPENDIX B. TREATY OF AMITY AND COOPERATION IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA INDONESIA, FEBRUARY 24, 1976 
Preamble 
The High Contracting Parties :  
 
CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and culture, which have bound 
their peoples together;  
 
ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and 
the rule or law and enhancing regional resilience in their relations;  
 
DESIRING to enhance peace, friendship and mutual cooperation on matters affecting 
Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference in Bandung on 25 
April 1955, the Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed in 
Bangkok on 8 August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 
November 1971;  
 
CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes between their countries 
should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding 
negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder cooperation;  
 
BELIEVING in the need for cooperation with all peace-loving nations, both within and 
outside Southeast Asia, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;  
 
SOLEMNLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as follows:  
CHAPTER I: PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES 
Article 1  
The purpose of this Treaty is to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and 
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cooperation among their peoples which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and 
closer relationship,  
 
Article 2  
In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the 
following fundamental principles :  
a.  Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of all nations;  
b.  The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coersion;  
c.  Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;  
d.  Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;  
e.  Renunciation of the threat or use of force;  
f.  Effective cooperation among themselves.  
CHAPTER II: AMITY 
Article 3  
In pursuance of the purpose of this Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to 
develop and strengthen the traditional, cultural and historical ties of friendship, good 
neighbourliness and cooperation which bind them together and shall fulfill in good faith 
the obligations assumed under this Treaty. In order to promote closer understanding 
among them, the High Contracting Parties shall encourage and facilitate contact and 
intercourse among their peoples.  
CHAPTER III: COOPERATION 
Article 4  
The High Contracting Parties shall promote active cooperation in the economic, social, 
technical, scientific and administrative fields as well as in matters of common ideals and 
aspiration of international peace and stability in the region and all other matters of 
common interest.  
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Article 5  
Pursuant to Article 4 the High Contracting Parties shall exert their maximum efforts 
multilaterally as well as bilaterally on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and 
mutual benefit.  
 
Article 6  
The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate for the acceleration of the economic 
growth in the region in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful 
community of nations in Southeast Asia. To this end, they shall promote the greater 
utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade and the 
improvement of their economic infrastructure for the mutual benefit of their peoples. In 
this regard, they shall continue to explore all avenues for close and beneficial cooperation 
with other States as well as international and regional ~organisations outside the region.  
 
Article 7  
The High Contracting Parties, in order to achieve social justice and to raise the standards 
of living of the peoples of the region, shall intensify economic cooperation. For this 
purpose, they shall adopt appropriate regional strategies for economic development and 
mutual assistance.  
 
Article 8  
The High Contracting Parties shall strive to achieve the closest cooperation on the widest 
scale and shall seek to provide assistance to one another in the form of training and 
research facilities in the social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields.  
 
Article 9  
The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to foster cooperation in the furtherance of 
the cause of peace, harmony, and stability in the region. To this end, the High 
Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts and consultations with one another on 
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international and regional matters with a view to coordinating their views actions and 
policies.  
 
Article 10  
Each High Contracting Parties shall not in any manner of form participate in any activity 
which shall constitute a treat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or 
territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party.  
 
Article 11  
The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to strengthen their respective national 
resilience in their political, economic, sociocultural as well as security fields in 
conformity with their respective ideals and aspirations, free from external interference as 
well as internal subversive activities in order to preserve their respective national 
identities.  
 
Article 12  
The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve regional prosperity and security, 
shall endeavour to cooperate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based 
on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation of 
solidarity which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of 
nations in Southeast Asia.  
CHAPTER IV: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES  
Article 13  
The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good faith to prevent 
disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters directly affecting them shall refrain 
from the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among 
themselves through friendly negotiations.  
 
Article 14  
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To settle disputes through regional processes, the High Contracting Parties shall 
constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comprising a Representative at 
ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognizance of the 
existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony.  
 
Article 15  
In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations, the High Council shall 
take cognizance of the dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parties in 
dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or 
conciliation. The High Council may however offer its good offices, or upon agreement of 
the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or 
conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall recommend appropriate 
measures for the prevention of a deterioration of the dispute or the situation.  
 
Article 16  
The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties 
to the dispute agree to their application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude 
the other High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute from offering all possible 
assistance to settle the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards 
such offers of assistance.  
 
Article 17  
Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes of peaceful settlement 
contained in Article 33(l) of the Charter of the United Nations. The High Contracting 
Parties which are parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to solve it 
by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
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CHAPTER V: GENERAL PROVISION 
Article 18  
This Treaty shall be signed by the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the 
Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand. It shall be ratified 
in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each signatory State. It shall be open 
for accession by other States in Southeast Asia.  
 
Article 19  
This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the fifth instrument of 
ratification with the Governments of the signatory States which are designated 
Depositories of this Treaty and the instruments of ratification or accession.  
 
Article 20  
This Treaty is drawn up in the official languages of the High Contracting Parties, all of 
which are equally authoritative. There shall be an agreed common translation of the texts 
in the English language. Any divergent interpretation of the common text shall be settled 
by negotiation.  
 
IN FAITH THEREOF the High Contracting Parties have signed the Treaty and have 
hereto affixed their Seals.  
 
DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February in the year one thousand 
nine hundred and seventy-six.  




APPENDIX C. DECLARATION ON THE CONDUCT OF PARTIES 
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
 
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Governments of the Member 
States of ASEAN,  
 
REAFFIRMING their determination to consolidate and develop the friendship and 
cooperation existing between their people and the governments with the view to 
promoting a 21st century-oriented partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust;  
 
 
COGNIZANT of the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment 
in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China for the enhancement of peace, 
stability, economic growth and prosperity in the region;  
 
COMMITTED to enhancing the principles and objectives of the 1997 Joint Statement of 
the Meeting of President of the People's Republic of China and the Heads of 
State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN;  
 
DESIRING to enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of 
differences and disputes among the countries concerned;  
HEREBY DECLARE the following:  
 
1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law which shall 
serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations;  
 106 
 
2. The Parties are committed to exploring ways for building trust and confidence in 
accordance with the above-mentioned principles and on the basis of equality and mutual 
respect;  
 
3. The Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of 
navigation in and over flight above the South China Sea as provided for by the 
universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea;  
 
4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional 
disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through 
friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in 
accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;  
 
5. The Parties undertake to exercise self- restraint in the conduct of activities that 
would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among 
others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, 
shoals, cays and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner;  
 
Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties 
concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and 
understanding, to build trust and confidence between and among them, including:  
 
a. Holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their 
defense and military   officials;  
 
 b. Ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in 




 c. Notifying, on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of any impending  
joint/combined military exercise; and  
 
 d. Exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information.  
 
 
6.  Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the Parties 
concerned may explore or undertake cooperative activities. These may include the 
following:  
 
 a. Marine environmental protection;  
 b. Marine scientific research;  
  c. Safety of navigation and communication at sea;  
 d. Search and rescue operation; and  
 e. Combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in 
illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.  
 
The modalities, scope and locations, in respect of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, 
should be agreed upon by the Parties concerned prior to their actual implementation.  
 
7.  The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their consultations and dialogues 
concerning relevant issues, through modalities to be agreed by them, including regular 
consultations on the observance of this Declaration, for the purpose of promoting good 
neighbourliness and transparency, establishing harmony, mutual understanding and 
cooperation, and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes among them;  
 
8.  The Parties undertake to respect the provisions of this Declaration and take 
actions consistent therewith;  
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9.  The Parties encourage other countries to respect the principles contained in this 
Declaration;  
 
10.  The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South 
China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on 
the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.  
 
Done on the Fourth Day of November in the Year Two Thousand and Two in Phnom 
Penh, the Kingdom of Cambodia. 
Source: Available at http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (10/2/03) 
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INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
3. Professor Gaye Christoffersen 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
4. Professor Lyman Miller 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
5. Commander Chin Yoon Chin 
Fleet Operations Command 
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